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Chapter 1 - Introduction, Methodology and Scope 
 
1. Uganda – A brief introduction  
Uganda has a population of 32.7 million and Gross Domestic Product amounted to US$ 15.7 
billion in 2009.1 It has substantial natural resources at its disposal, including fertile soils, regu-
lar rainfall, sizeable mineral deposits of copper and cobalt. Now recently also significant 
amounts of oil2 and natural gas have been explored in western Uganda.  
The Ugandan economy is still consumption driven: Agriculture, producing tea, coffee and flow-
ers, is still the most important sector of the economy employing over 70% of the work force 
and accounting for over 90% of exports, even though the fishing sector, the manufacturing 
and the service sector increased their share of Gross Domestic Product.3  
2.  The burden of being a landlocked country 
Since Uganda does not have its own access to the sea, i.e. is landlocked, most Ugandan ex-
ports and imports are transported on road on the Northern Corridor between Kampala and 
Mombasa, whereas transport by railway and airplane only account for less than 10% of the 
aggregate exports and imports.4  
2.1. Dual vulnerability of Uganda  
Over the past years the burden of landlocked countries and the relation between transport 
costs and trade have come into the focus of the discussion of international trade:5 One of the 
main obstacles of landlocked countries is their so-called 'dual vulnerability', i.e. they are (i) 
vulnerable on their own account for trade restrictions within their own country and (ii) in addi-
tion to that they are also dependent on the goodwill, infrastructure and procedures within the 
transit country on which the landlocked country has no or only limited influence.6  
                                           
1 
 Robert ZL et al (eds.) The Global Enabling Trade Report 2010 (2010), page 270. 
2
  So far the exploitable oil deposits are estimated to amount to over 2 billion barrels, see Kavuma R „Great expec-
tations in Uganda over oil discovery‟ (2009). 
3
  World Bank Uganda Moving Beyond Recovery: Investment & Behaviour Change, For Growth (2007) pages 11 and 
47 f. 
4  Olanyo, Josef 'Traders seek options for sea routes' (2012) 
5 
 Arvis JF et al The Costs of Being Landlocked - Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability (2010); United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development Trade, Trade Facilitation and Transit Transport Issues for Landlocked De-
veloping Countries (2007); Annovazzi JL Landlocked countries: opportunities, challenges and recommendations, 
in: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe - Cosgrove-Sacks C & Apostolov M (eds.), (2003) Trade Fa-
cilitation: The Challenges for Growth and Development; Faye M et al The challenges facing landlocked developing 
countries (2004); Rudaheranwa N Trade policy and transport costs in Uganda (2009); Irwin AD & Tervio M Does 
trade raise income? Evidence from the 20th Century (2002); Sachs JD et al Ending Africa's Poverty Trap (2004).  
6
  Annovazzi JL Landlocked countries: opportunities, challenges and recommendations, in: United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe - Cosgrove-Sacks C & Apostolov M (eds.), (2003) Trade Facilitation: The Challenges for 
Growth and Development, page 83; Thapa R Article V of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994: From the 
perspective of ensuring freedom of transit to landlocked countries (2010), page 2. 
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2.2. Higher trade costs of landlocked countries 
Traders in landlocked countries in general face higher trade costs than their competitors from 
maritime countries. These additional costs comprise of direct and indirect transit costs for the 
transport of goods through a neighbouring country to such a port.7  
 Direct transit costs consist for example of port and transit fees as well as fuel, labour 
and maintenance costs for the trucks to travel through the transit country.  
 Indirect costs, in contrast, consist of the (i) non-transport costs of traders to over-
come trade barriers such as (a) costs to comply with the comprehensive documenta-
tion requirements and administrative procedures, (b) delays at the port resulting in 
demurrage fees, (c) delays and bribes to be paid at roadblocks, weigh-bridges and the 
border, (d) additional maintenance costs resulting from inadequate infrastructure facil-
ities, in particular due to bad roads,8 and (e) costly transactions such as insurance 
bonds and the (ii) the so-called “hedging costs” incurred by traders to cope with the 
uncertainty of unpredictable delivery schedules.  
The effect of these hedging costs on trade has been examined in detail in various studies only 
recently9: In particular because of this uncertainty and unpredictability traders in landlocked 
underdeveloped countries have to maintain higher stocks of goods to be able to meet the de-
mand of their customers in case the next delivery is delayed. By providing this additional in-
ventory, a higher amount of the traders‟ financial resources is bound than in (developed) mari-
time countries, where traders can rely on the delivery of the ordered goods just in time. Fur-
thermore, traders also have to pay for the warehousing of the higher stock of goods.10 Alterna-
tively, they can also shift to a faster, more expensive mode of transportation.11  
In general, indirect costs have a greater impact on traders than direct costs have since labour 
and fuel costs are usually not so high in landlocked developing countries.  
2.3. Effects on trade - reduced competitiveness 
The effect of these additional transit costs on trade has also been subject to certain recent 
studies which agree that such high transportation costs result in a significant disadvantage of 
                                           
7  Arvis JF et al The Costs of Being Landlocked - Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability (2010), page 26 ff. 
8
  The road system in Kenya is one of the worst in the East African Community. Because of the bad state of the 
roads, trucks transiting Kenya have to drive slower and maintenance costs are also higher, see Arvis JF et al The 
Costs of Being Landlocked - Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability (2010), page 38. 
9
  Arvis JF et al The Costs of Being Landlocked - Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability (2010); United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development Trade, Trade Facilitation and Transit Transport Issues for Landlocked De-
veloping Countries (2007); Freund C & Rocha N What constraints Africa's exports? (2010); Christ N et al Land 
transport for exports: The effects of cost, time and uncertainty in Sub-Saharan Africa (2009). 
10
 Arvis JF et al The Costs of Being Landlocked - Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability (2010), page 32 f.; 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Trade, Trade Facilitation and Transit Transport Issues for 
Landlocked Developing Countries (2007), page 33. In regard to the uncertainty see also Freund C & Rocha N 
What constraints Africa's exports? (2010), page 4; Christ N et al Land transport for exports: The effects of cost, 
time and uncertainty in Sub-Saharan Africa (2009), pages 17 ff. 
11
  Arvis JF et al The Costs of Being Landlocked - Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability (2010), page 32 f. 
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landlocked countries, such as Uganda, to compete with its maritime neighbours, such as Kenya 
or Tanzania, in its own domestic market or on the global market12:  
 Rudaheranwa, for example, argues that the Ugandan transit costs are equivalent to 
effective protection of over 20% as well as to an implicit tax on exports of over 25%.13  
 Pursuant to a study by Faye et al., the increased costs of trade for landlocked coun-
tries are represented by the ratio of transport and insurance costs to the total value of 
exports and for landlocked countries this ratio generally lies approximately 9% higher 
than for their maritime neighbours.14 In the case of Kenya, this ratio amounts to 0.13, 
whereas the respective ratio for Uganda is 0.35 - almost three times as high as for 
Kenya.15 It is worth noting that Faye's model does not take into consideration the ad-
ditional costs of transport and transit delays or further transit related costs, such as 
bribes to be paid on the numerous roadblocks and weigh-bridges as well as for ser-
vices rendered at the respective customs facilities at the port or the border.16 Thus, 
the actual trade disadvantage for Ugandan traders is even higher than the ratio pro-
vided by Faye.  
 According to another study by Freund and Rocha, one day of delay in transit translates 
into a 1.5 percentage points decrease in all importing country tariffs. In other words, a 
one day reduction in transit time would lead to a 7% increase in exports.17  
 Arvis et al. plead in their study to use a micro-level based supply chain model to 
measure the negative trade effects of transportation costs, which also considers such 
non-transport and so-called delays hedging costs.18 However, it should be pointed out 
that Arvis et al. do not present any calculation or practical results in their work and, 
thus provides only limited contribution to this thesis. 
According to these studies, transit costs result in increased import prices and reduced export 
revenues in the landlocked country19 and thus undermine the competitiveness of landlocked 
                                           
12
  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Trade, Trade Facilitation and Transit Transport Issues for 
Landlocked Developing Countries (2007), page 31. 
13
  Rudaheranwa N Trade policy and transport costs in Uganda (2009), page 19.  
14
  Faye M et al The challenges facing landlocked developing countries (2004), page 40.  
15
  Faye M et al The challenges facing landlocked developing countries (2004), page 41 (Table 3).  
16
  Pursuant to information provided by CPCS Transcom, the bribes paid at roadblocks and weigh-bridges alone can 
amount in total to more than US$1,000 for an import container, depending on the value of the cargo, see CPCS 
Transcom Analytical comparative transport costs study along the Northern Corridor Region (2010). However, pur-
suant to the EAC Business Climate Index the average bribe per weigh-bridge amounts only to US$ 2.10, see East 
African Business Council The Business Climate Index Survey 2008 (2008), page 5). 
17 
 Freund C & Rocha N What constraints Africa's exports? (2010), page 4. 
18
  Arvis JF et al The Costs of Being Landlocked - Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability (2010), page 9 and in 
particular Appendix 2. Please note that the Authors do not apply their model in the book to any data, so the benefit 
of this model cannot be assessed.  
19
  Arvis JF et al The Costs of Being Landlocked - Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability, (2010), page 2. 
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countries on the international market.20 Since tariff barriers have been reduced considerably 
within the recent past direct and indirect transit costs have gained importance in the discussion 
of international trade due to their greater effect on restraining the participation of landlocked 
countries on regional and international markets.21 
2.4. Socio-economic effects of being a landlocked country 
The geographical disadvantage of being a landlocked country has not only a negative effect on 
trade, but also on the overall socio-economic development of landlocked countries: The trade 
reducing effect of high transport costs for landlocked countries (i) feeds into product prices and 
thus diminishes the purchasing power and consumption levels of the national residents, (ii) 
decreases the rate of return on capital investors require to finance a project within a country, 
and (iii) as a consequence significantly impacts Gross Domestic Product negatively.22 Pursuant 
to certain studies, average Gross Domestic Income per capita of landlocked countries is only 
approximately 57% of that of their maritime neighbours.23 Moreover on average landlocked 
countries trade 30% less than maritime countries.24  
However, it has to be noted that the disadvantage of being landlocked varies significantly de-
pending on the level of development of the transit countries, in particular its transit infrastruc-
ture and the respective administrative procedures: In the case of landlocked European coun-
tries, such as Switzerland, Hungary or Austria, the burden of being landlocked is significantly 
lower than in the case of landlocked African countries such as Malawi, Niger, Mali or Uganda, 
where transit infrastructure and administrative procedures in the neighbouring transit coun-
tries are in a poor condition and highly ineffective in comparison.25  
2.5. The Ugandan case  
Uganda, as a landlocked country, also faces the aforementioned challenges26: Goods coming 
from or destined to Uganda have to transit through Kenya, which is the closest connection to a 
sea port and, thus, the main transit route, or they are shipped through the Central Corridor in 
Tanzania. This transport of goods from or to the port of Mombasa entails additional direct and 
                                           
20
  Rudaheranwa N Trade policy and transport costs in Uganda (2009), page 25; Vasudave D et al Trade & Develop-
ment in Least Developed Countries – Assessing Transport & Trade Facilitation in Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania 
(2010), page 2.  
21
  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Trade, Trade Facilitation and Transit Transport Issues for 
Landlocked Developing Countries (2007), page 21 and 25; Arvis JF et al The Costs of Being Landlocked - Logistics 
Costs and Supply Chain Reliability (2010), pages 25 ff. 
22 
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Trade, Trade Facilitation and Transit Transport Issues for 
Landlocked Developing Countries (2007), page 10; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Assessing Re-
gional Integration in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra-African Trade (2010), page 241.  
23  
Faye M et al The challenges facing landlocked developing countries (2004), page 33.  
24  
Irwin AD & Tervio M Does trade raise income? Evidence from the 20th Century'(2002).  
25 
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Trade, Trade Facilitation and Transit Transport Issues for 
Landlocked Developing Countries (2007), page 25; Christ N et al Land transport for exports: The effects of cost, 
time and uncertainty in Sub-Saharan Africa (2009), page 5. 
26  
It has to be noted that Uganda as a least developed country suffers - in addition to the transit problem - from an 
ineffective infrastructure within the country, in particular in regard to roads, rails and utilities such as electricity 
and telecommunication. These restrictions also need urgently to be addressed in order to create further economic 
growth. However, in the following this thesis will focus in particular on Ugandan transit restrictions in Kenya.  
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indirect costs for Ugandan traders 27: These additional direct and indirect transit costs for 
Ugandan traders – which are not incurred by their competitors from Tanzania or Kenya – for 
instance, amounted to 36% of the value of exported Ugandan goods in 2001.28  
The dramatic effect of direct and indirect transit costs on trade also becomes apparent when 
comparing the transport costs of a 20ft container from Mombasa to Kampala worth US$ 2,700 
to US$ 4,80029 for a distance of 1,170 km which can be over 200% of the cost of transporting 
the same container from Europe to Mombasa.30 An important part of these costs is caused in 
Uganda's neighbouring countries: Pursuant to a study by Mimouni, these countries account for 
more than 40% of all reported trade barriers, despite existing trade agreements31: One expla-
nation for that is that Ugandan exporters also have to comply with transit country health and 
safety requirements in addition to the respective requirements of their final export destinations. 
3. Possible solutions for Uganda to overcome this dilemma 
One way to escape the dilemma of being a landlocked country is to invest in an efficient infra-
structure and trade environment, both in the country itself and in the neighbouring transit 
countries – in regard to the latter, mainly by way of co-operation and joint infrastructure pro-
jects – in order to facilitate trade, as we have seen for landlocked European countries. Suc-
cessful trade facilitation measures can reduce transport and transit costs, can make border 
controls more effective, can enhance trade competitiveness and can, thus, even create new 
trade.32  
3.1. Trade facilitation 
Because of this, trade facilitation has been widely discussed in international trade during the 
last decade. The World Trade Organisation (hereinafter referred to as the „WTO“), and numer-
ous other international institutions such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (hereinafter referred to as „UNCTAD“), the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (hereinafter referred to as „UNECE“), the World Customs Organisation (hereinafter re-
ferred to as „WCO“), the International Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter referred to as „ICC“) 
or the International Maritime Organisation (hereinafter referred to as „IMO“) have issued rec-
ommendations and guidelines for trade facilitation. Furthermore, two binding conventions exist: 
                                           
27  
Faye M et al The challenges facing landlocked developing countries (2004), pages 47 f.  
28  
Ancharaz V et al The First Africa Region Review for EAC/COMESA (2010), page 9. 
29  
The respective amount varies between the different reports. Pursuant to Tumuhumbise C & Ihiga S A Survey of 
Non-Tariff-Barriers that affect Ugandan Imports and Exports within EAC and COMESA Countries (2007), page 36, 
the transport costs for a 40 foot container amounted on average to US$ 2,500, whereas Wambi M Business wants 
to put brakes on new Common Market (2010), states these costs with US$ 4,800. Some other Reports estimate 
the respective costs about US$ 3,500.  
30
  Tumuhumbise C & Ihiga S A Survey of Non-Tariff-Barriers that affect Ugandan Imports and Exports within EAC and 
COMESA Countries (2007), page 37; Wambi M Business wants to put brakes on new Common Market (2010).  
31
  Mimouni M et al Obstacles to Trade from the Perspective of the Business Sector: A Cross-Country Comparison, in: 
Robert ZL et al (eds.) The Global Enabling Trade Report 2009 (2009), pages 72 f. 
32
  Simpson J A 'Tour of the on-going Work of the World Trade Organisation on Trade Facilitation: The Traders Per-
spective', in: Robert ZL et al (eds.) 'The Global Enabling Trade Report 2009' (2009), page 60; Akinkugbe O 'Trade 
Facilitation And Africa's Manufactured Goods Export: A Panel Data Analysis' (2009); Portugal-Perez A & Wilson JS. 
'Why trade facilitation matters to Africa' (2009). 
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(i) the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonisation of Customs Proce-
dures of 1974 of the WCO (revised in 1999, hereinafter referred to as the „Revised Kyoto Con-
vention“) and (ii) the UNECE Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover 
of TIR Carnets of 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the „TIR Convention“). Currently, trade facil-
itation is also part of the still on-going so-called WTO Doha Negotiations Round.33  
3.1.1. Definition 
Up to date, however, no consensus has been reached on a definition of trade facilitation, i.e. 
what specific measures are covered in this respect.34 The WTO defines trade facilitation as “the 
simplification and harmonization of international trade procedures” where international trade 
procedures are defined as the “activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, pre-
senting, communicating and processing data required for the movement of goods in interna-
tional trade.”35 The advantage of this narrow definition is that it focuses mainly on the refor-
mation and harmonisation of customs procedures which are critical to international trade: Cus-
toms is the primary agency at international borders with comprehensive responsibilities such 
as the collection of duties and other taxes or the enforcement of national laws regarding public 
health and safety and intellectual property.36 An insufficient and ineffective customs perfor-
mance consequently has a tremendous negative impact on most international trade transac-
tions.  
According to broader approaches, trade facilitation comprises not only customs issues, but the 
aggregate environment in which trade takes place, i.e. all stages of the supply chain.37 Conse-
quently, it also includes the improvement of trade-related infrastructure and the provision of 
efficient and competitive services. The ICC, for example, defines trade facilitation as „the 
adoption of a comprehensive and integrated approach to simplifying and reducing the cost of 
international trade transactions, and ensuring that the relevant activities take place in an effi-
cient, transparent and predictable manner based on internationally accepted norms and stand-
ards and best practices“.  
Considering the purpose of trade facilitation, which is – insofar all definitions agree – to reduce 
time and costs of business transactions,38 the broader definition of trade facilitation seems 
more appropriate: Otherwise, i.e. if one would only consider the customs procedures and re-
                                           
33  
In this respect, please see also Chapter 6 below. 
34   
Bolhöfer, Caroline Eve 'Trade facilitation – WTO law and its revision to facilitate global trade in goods' (2007), page 
32; Grainger A 'Customs and trade facilitation: From concepts to implementation' (2007), page 20; Mutahunga E 
'Trade facilitation as an engine for development – The Ugandan case' (2005), page 2. 
35
  Cosgrove-Sacks C et al 'Trade Facilitation: The Challenges for Growth and Development' (2003), page 10; 
Sheikhan P 'Trade Facilitation in the Multilateral Trading System – An Analysis of the Doha Round Negotiations on 
Trade Facilitation' (2008), page 8. 
36
  Simpson J 'A Tour of the On-going Work of the World Trade Organisation on Trade Facilitation: The Traders Per-
spective', in: Robert ZL et al (eds.) The Global Enabling Trade Report 2009 (2009), page 60. 
37  
Milner C et al 'Trade facilitation in developing countries' (2008), page 4 ff.; Buyonge C & Kireeva I 'Trade facilita-
tion in Africa: Challenges and possible solutions' (2007), page 41; Ancharaz V et al The First Africa Region Review 
for EAC/COMESA (2010), page 6. 
38  
Kafeero E 'Customs and trade facilitation in the East African Community' (2008), page 63; Njinkeu D et al 'Trade 
facilitation – What it is and how does it help?' (2007), page 3. 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
quirements at the border leaving the goods to their own on their way to the trader on inade-
quate road and rail networks, at the numerous official and unofficial roadblocks and weigh-
bridges or with other restrictions, the majority of trade restrictions, in particular the ones to 
the transit through another country, would not fall under this definition.  
3.1.2. Focus of trade facilitation efforts 
In the past, the solution for landlocked countries was mainly seen to lie in the improvement of 
road and rail infrastructure, both in landlocked and transit countries. Much money was spent 
for comprehensive infrastructure projects, the outcome of which was disappointing: In many 
cases the lengthy and costly development of new and the improvement of the existing infra-
structure did not have the expected impact on transportation prices.39 One reason for this was 
that this strategy did not consider other transit restrictions such as inefficient customs or 
transport services due to a lack of capacity and monopoles in the latter sector. Even if the 
transport time from the port to the border was – in some cases – reduced significantly by bet-
ter roads, much time and money was – and still is – lost either at the port, on the road from 
the port to the border or at the border due to insufficient logistic and personnel capacities, 
cumbersome transit procedures, corruption at roadblocks, etc.40  
In addition, on the Northern Corridor the transit time between Mombasa and Kampala has 
been reduced significantly from 39 to 46 days before 1994 to between 12 and 15 days in 
200341 and on average 7 days in 200742. This was mainly due to infrastructural improvements. 
Yet, now the situation may arise that Ugandan trucks transiting through Kenya will have to 
spend more time waiting at the port to form a convoy and then again at the border to Uganda 
than they need to travel through the whole of Kenya.43 Without having addressed these non-
physical restrictions even the best infrastructure could not have resulted in lower transporta-
tion costs. The newer literature thus has extended the discussion on the improvement of trans-
it related services and the liberalisation of transport sectors.44  
In 2003, the International Ministerial Conference of Landlocked and Transit Developing Coun-
tries, Donor Countries and Various International Institutions was held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, 
resulting in the so-called Almaty Programme of Action. This programme aims to tackle the 
costs of being landlocked by (i) reviewing and facilitating transport regulatory frameworks, (ii) 
developing multi-modal networks (road, rail and pipeline infrastructure projects) and (iii) im-
plementing trade and transport facilitation measures in both landlocked and transit countries. 
                                           
39  
Raballand G & Macchi P 'Transport prices and costs: The need to revisit donor's policies in transport in Africa' 
(2008).  
40  
Ancharaz V et al The First Africa Region Review for EAC/COMESA (2010), page 5; Tumuhumbise C & Ihiga S A 
Survey of Non-Tariff-Barriers that affect Ugandan Imports and Exports within EAC and COMESA Countries (2007), 
pages 36 f. 
41
  Rudaheranwa N 'Trade policy and transport costs in Uganda' (2009), page 19.  
42  
Ihiga S Monitoring Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers in EAC (2009), page 60. 
43  
Kenyan Shippers Council 'Kenya: Issues in Trade Logistics' (2005), page 39.  
44  
Behar A 'Africa: Transit needs more than infrastructure boost' (2008), page 5; Raballand G & Macchi P 'Transport 
prices and costs: The need to revisit donor's policies in transport in Africa' (2008), pages 3 f.; Ancharaz V et al The 
First Africa Region Review for EAC/COMESA (2010), pages 9 ff. 
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The international community is supposed to assist poorer landlocked and transit countries by 
providing technical and financial support and by encouraging foreign direct investment.45  
In 2008, the United Nations General Assembly held a midterm review of the implementation of 
the Almaty Programme of Action. All in all, landlocked and transit developing countries have 
made tangible progress in implementing the Almaty Programme of Action as far as trade de-
velopment is concerned. In 2007 for example, traders in landlocked countries only spent on 
average 49 days to export and 56 days to import, in contrast to 2006 where they spent 57 and 
72 days respectively.46 But there are still various matters of concern, such as the need to im-
prove procedural, regulatory and institutional systems as well as customs and bureaucracy 
fees, inadequate infrastructure, transit problems, inefficient transport organisation, as well as 
increasing technical and financial international assistance.47  
3.2. Political and economic reforms 
Uganda made several attempts to cope with these obstacles after it had become independent. 
After having gained independence, the Ugandan history has been rather eventful with authori-
tarian governments and civil wars. Uganda and its economy have been challenged by political 
instability ever since Uganda has gained independence in 1966, in particular under the rule of 
Idi Amin (between 1971 and 1979) and the following civil war between the Ugandan People's 
Congress of Milton Obote (the “UPC”) and the National Resistance Army (the “NRA” – the mili-
tary arm of the now ruling National Resistance Movement, “NRM” of President Museveni) in the 
early 1980's. In this time period, the Ugandan economy declined – besides the effects of the 
civil war – due to (i) the expulsion of the – at that time – economically important Asian com-
munity in Uganda under Idi Amin, (ii) anti-export bias created by state-owned trade and pro-
cessing monopoles as well as (iii) a tight control over the foreign exchange market.48 As a re-
sult thereof, Uganda's economy was almost ruined in 1986 when the new (and current) gov-
ernment took over, with a high inflation, a shrinking Gross Domestic Product and all sectors 
operating beyond their full capacity.49   
However, since the present government came into power in 1986 calm has returned to Uganda. 
The newly elected government under President Museveni then re-established stability putting 
largely an end to the human rights abuses of earlier governments, initiating over the years 
political liberalization and general freedom of the press, and instituting broad economic re-
forms after consultation with the International Monetary Fund, such as the diversification of 
                                           
45 
 Almaty Programme of Action: Addressing the Special Needs of Landlocked Developing Countries within a New 
Global Framework for Transit Transport Cooperation for Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries (2003), 
downloaded on 25 November 2010 at http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/lldc/Almaty_PoA.pdf. 
46 
 Pursuant to Mr Diarra, United Nations Under-Secretary-General, Special Adviser on Africa and High Representative 
for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, speaking 
at a press conference on the occasion of the 2-3 October high-level meeting devoted to the midterm review of the 
Almaty Programme of Action, downloaded on 25 November 2010 at 
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/081002_Almaty.doc.htm. 
47
  Pursuant to Mr Diarra, see previous footnote.  
48
  Morrissey O et al Trade Policies, Performance and Poverty in Uganda (2006), page 4. 
49  
World Bank Uganda, Moving Beyond Recovery: Investment & Behaviour Change, For Growth (2007), page 2 (1.4). 
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the economy away from the production of traditionally traded goods (coffee, tea, tobacco and 
cotton) to non-traditional goods (flowers, fish and fish products, gold and corn), but also in 
regard to trade partners.50 The Economic Recovery Programme („ERP“), launched in 1987, set 
in place comprehensive structural reforms focusing in particular on market and trade liberalisa-
tion, in order to improve the competitiveness of Ugandan exports and to restore incentives for 
producers. These reforms consisted, inter alia, of the51:  
 Implementation of various trade facilitation measures, such as the introduction of an 
open general licence scheme, the introduction of a certification system instead of the 
existing import and export licensing system or the introduction of a duty drawback 
scheme;  
 Significant reduction of the existing tariff rates from a tariff schedule in 1995 with 0%, 
10%, 20%, 30% and 60% to one in 2001 consisting of 0%, 7.5% and 15%;52 and  
 Abolishment of taxes on exports.  
As a consequence of these reforms, Uganda experienced significant growth in its economy, 
with an average annual real growth of 6.9% in the 1990's.53 This growth rate was mainly driv-
en by an increase of Ugandan exports, in particular by the coffee boom in the 1990's but also 
by the export of non-traditional goods, such as fish, flowers and gold.54  
In the time period between 2001 and 2003, however, the recovery of the Ugandan economy 
seemed to have come to an end: the decline of commodity prices – in particular of Uganda's 
main export commodities coffee and fish – and the escalating price for petroleum together with 
a severe draught in the years 2002 and 2003 slowed down Ugandan economic growth.55 Ugan-
da has undertaken various efforts to facilitate its internal and external trade in order to in-
crease economic growth again - also within the framework of the re-established East African 
Community. As a result thereof, in 2005, Uganda had one of the most liberal trade regimes of 
any African country.56 Between 2005 and 2009 Uganda‟s Gross Domestic Product increased 
                                           
50
  Morrissey O et al Trade Policies, Performance and Poverty in Uganda (2006), page 7; World Bank Uganda, Moving 
Beyond Recovery: Investment & Behaviour Change, For Growth (2007), page 13; Rudaheranwa N 'Trade policy 
and transport costs in Uganda' (2009), page 6; Tumuhumbise C & Ihiga S A Survey of Non-Tariff-Barriers that af-
fect Ugandan Imports and Exports within EAC and COMESA Countries (2007), pages 8 f.  
51  
Morrissey O et al Trade Policies, Performance and Poverty in Uganda (2006), page 4. 
52  
In 2001, Uganda thus had the lowest tariffs in the COMESA region, with an average Ugandan tariff for COMESA 
countries of 6% and one average Ugandan tariff of 12% for other countries, in contrast to the respective COMESA 
average tariffs of 19% and 33%. 
53  
World Bank Uganda, Moving beyond Recovery: Investment & Behaviour Change, For Growth (2007), pages 4 f. 
(1.8 and 1.13). 
54 
 Morrissey O et al Trade Policies, Performance and Poverty in Uganda (2006), page 7; World Bank Uganda, Moving 
beyond Recovery: Investment & Behaviour Change, For Growth (2007), page 13. 
55 
 International Monetary Fund Uganda – Staff Report for the 2006 Article IV Consultation, First Review of the Policy 
Support Instrument, Request for Waiver Criteria, and Request for a Three Year Policy Support Guarantee (2007), 
pages 5 f. 
56
  Morrissey O et al Trade Policies, Performance and Poverty in Uganda (2006), page 1. 
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again from US$ 10.0 to 15.7 billion, with an average real Gross Domestic Product growth of 
7%.57  
It has to be noted that, even though the Ugandan trade volume has increased since 2005, 
trade in Uganda has not developed as significantly as it was expected to do under the prevail-
ing economic theory.58 Furthermore, the share of Ugandan exports to the aggregate global 
exports has remained the same in this time period, i.e. 0.01%.59 And, in addition to that, 
Ugandan exports still comprise mainly unprocessed, non-value-added agricultural products60: 
Pursuant to a study by Bakunda, Uganda's value added agricultural sector is enormously chal-
lenged by – mostly Kenyan, European and South African – imports which have already 
swamped out the respective Ugandan products in many cases.61 According to Reinert, the un-
processed agricultural sector alone is not capable of generating sustainable growth because of 
its diminishing returns.62 Moreover, the ability of Ugandan farmers to compete with farmers in 
the first world is limited to subtropical conditions with erratic rainfalls and a limited use of ferti-
lizers since they are too expensive due to the high transport costs.63  
Uganda should therefore focus its efforts on promoting the production and export of value 
added products.64 But, since Ugandan producers are not yet competitive in this sector due to 
the landlockedness of the country, another possibility could be to also promote services, since 
in that sector transit costs do not play a vital role.  
3.3. Regional integration – The East African Community 
In addition to these structural reforms, Uganda also promoted a policy of regional integration 
to secure new peace and stability in the region as well as to improve trade in the region: 
Uganda initiated and became – together with Kenya and Tanzania – a founding Partner State 
of the East African Community taking up economic cooperation of colonial and post-colonial 
times.65  
                                           
57  Robert ZL et al (eds.) The Global Enabling Trade Report 2010 (2010), page 270; also see 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Uganda. 
58
  Bakunda G 'The impact of a liberalised trade regime on the potential for agricultural value addition in Uganda' 
(2008), page 29. 
59  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Trade, Trade Facilitation and Transit Transport Issues for 
Landlocked Developing Countries (2007), page 31.  
60  Bakunda G 'The impact of a liberalised trade regime on the potential for agricultural value addition in Uganda' 
(2008), page 33. 
61  Bakunda G 'The impact of a liberalised trade regime on the potential for agricultural value addition in Uganda' 
(2008), page 46. 
62  
Reinert E How Rich Countries Got Rich and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor (2007), page 154. 
63  
Sachs JD et al Ending Africa's Poverty Trap (2004), page 133. 
64
  Wiegratz J et al Competing and Learning in Global Value Chains: Firms Experiences in the Case of Uganda – A 
Study of five Sub-Sectors with Reference to Trade between Uganda and Europe (2007), pages 45 ff. 
65
  Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania were colonised under British control as Tanganyika. In 1948, Britain established the 
East African High Commission to oversee the common services such as rails, harbours, postal and custom services. 
After the countries attained independence the common service initiatives were to be continued under the East Afri-
can Cooperation which was established in 1967. However, the East African Cooperation crumbled from a lack of po-
litical will, inter-territorial imbalances in trade and an inequitable redistribution of gains and thus ceased meetings 
and operation in 1971. 
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3.3.1. Establishment and development of the EAC 
On 30 November 1999, the Treaty was signed in Arusha by the presidents of the founding 
Partner States Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania,66 it entered into force on 7 July 2000.  
Objective of the EAC is the comprehensive cooperation of the Partner States ”in order to 
strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial, infrastructural, cultural, social, political and 
other relations of the Partner States to the end that there shall be accelerated, harmonious 
and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic activities, the benefit of 
which shall be equitably shared.”67 In accordance with the built-in agenda of the Treaty,68 in 
2005, the Partner States entered into the EAC Customs Union (Protocol on the Establishment 
of the East African Customs Union, dated 2 March 2004, hereinafter referred to as the “Cus-
toms Union Protocol”) and five years later they joined the Common Market (Protocol on the 
Establishment of the East African Common Market, dated 20 November 2009, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the “Common Market Protocol”).  
3.3.2. Main principles of the EAC 
In these Protocols, the Partner States have confirmed and substantiated the main principles 
set out in Article 7 of the Treaty, such as:  
 the principle of good governance;69 
 the provision by the Partner States of an adequate and appropriate enabling environ-
ment, such as conducive policies and basic infrastructure;70  
 the comprehensive co-operation in political, economic, social and cultural fields as well 
as security, legal and judicial affairs;71  
 the principle of asymmetry;72 or  
 the equitable distribution of benefits accruing or to be derived from the operations of 
the Community and measures to address economic imbalances that may arise from 
such operations.73 
3.3.3. Effects of the EAC Customs Union on Uganda 
The implementation of the Customs Union tremendously increased intra-EAC trade: For exam-
ple, exports from Uganda to the rest of the EAC increased from US$ 132.0 million in 2004 to 
US$ 152.8 million in 2006 and at last in 2008 they amounted to US$ 377.4 million; in the 
                                           
66
  Rwanda and Burundi acceded to the EAC only in 2007.  
67  
Article 5(1) and 5(2) of the Treaty.  
68
  Pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Treaty, the Partner States: „undertake to establish among themselves [...] a Cus-
toms Union, a Common Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation [...].‟  
69
  Article 7(2) of the Treaty.  
70
  Article 7(1)(b) of the Treaty.  
71  
Article 5(1) of the Treaty.  
72  
Article 7(1)(h) of the Treaty. 
73
  Article 7(1)(f) of the Treaty.  
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same time period Ugandan imports from the rest of the EAC increased from US$ 416.3 million 
in 2004 to US$ 570.6 million in 2008.74 
Yet, the introduction of the Common External Tariff (in particular the 10% tariff band for semi-
finished goods, but also the maximum common external tariff of 25%) in the course of the EAC 
Customs Union in 2005 also had a negative effect for Uganda: Ugandan tariffs for goods from 
outside the EAC and, thus, the average effective rate of protection, had been raised substan-
tially after progress was made pursuing a liberal trade regime in the 1990's significantly in-
creasing prices for imports from outside the EAC and, at the same time, strengthening protec-
tion of Ugandan producers against competition from abroad the EAC. For example the effective 
rate of protection for the following sectors more than doubled75: manufactured goods,76 tex-
tiles, clothing and footwear,77 chemicals,78 metals and machinery79 and transport equipment80. 
On the other hand, protection of Ugandan producers towards competition from within the EAC 
has been reduced since, with effect as of 1 January 2010, all tariffs in the EAC have been abol-
ished after lapse of the transitional period between 2005 and 2010 with asymmetric tariff re-
gimes in the different Partner States. In particular, competition from Kenya pose problems for 
Ugandan producers in certain sectors since their competitors can produce cheaper due to their 
direct access to the sea and cheaper production costs resulting thereof. As a consequence of 
this, there have been negative welfare effects in Uganda.81 
3.3.4. Trade facilitation efforts in the EAC 
This increase in import and production costs was supposed to be offset by reduced trade costs 
due to the reduced tariffs for intra-EAC trade and increased trade facilitation measures within 
the EAC pursuant to Article 6 of the Customs Union Protocol. In order to improve the trade 
volumes of the Partner States and thus economic growth within the EAC members have im-
plemented a comprehensive trade facilitation programme consisting of, inter alia,82  
 increased customs cooperation such as the introduction of one-border posts;  
 the simplification and harmonisation of customs procedures and legislation;83  
 the harmonisation and introduction of standards;  
                                           
74
  East African Community East African Community Facts and Figures - 2009 (2010), page 36. 
75  
Rudaheranwa N 'Trade policy and transport costs in Uganda' (2009), page 16. 
76  
From 23% to over 60%. 
77
  From 31% to about 87%. 
78  
From 28% to over 85%. 
79  
From 25% to over 71%. 
80
  From 25% to over 69%. 
81  
Khorana S et al 'Regional integration under the East African Community: An assessment of the trade and welfare 
effects for Uganda' (2007), pages 15 ff.; Khorana S et al 'Assessing the welfare effects of the East African Commu-
nity Customs Union's transition arrangements in Uganda' (2009).  
82
  The World Bank Doing Business in the East African Community (2010), pages 38 ff.; Word Trade Organisation 
Trade Policy Review - Report by the Secretariat - East African Community (2006), pages 2 ff. 
83
  See also in this context for example the EAC Customs Management Act (2004). 
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 the introduction of a monitoring mechanism for elimination of non-tariff barriers in  the 
EAC and  
 the abolishment of tariffs from goods within the EAC. 
However, it has to be noted, that these measures are only implemented very slowly in practice, 
e.g. the Kenyan authorities in many cases still do not accept sanitation certificates of its 
neighbouring partner institutions and most reported non-tariff barriers are not followed up and 
eliminated by the respective authorities.  
3.3.5. Still dependant on Kenya for the transport of goods through Kenya 
The transport of goods to or from Uganda through Kenya for Ugandan traders has been – and 
still is, despite all trade facilitation initiatives in Uganda and of the EAC – subject to a vast 
amount of measures adopted in Kenya resulting in further costs and delays, such as84:  
 demurrage charges at the port of Mombasa after the short grace period for warehous-
ing of the goods in the amount of 21 days has lapsed;  
 countless roadblocks (the various reports differ in regard to the amount of roadblocks 
between up to 27 between the Ugandan border and the port in Mombasa,85 according 
to another report on the road between Malaba and Eldoret alone, a journey of only 1.5 
hours, approximately 8 road blocks have been recorded86);  
 numerous compulsory and mobile weigh-bridges between Mombasa and the Ugandan 
border;87  
 Kenyan police only allows trucks registered in Kenya to transport goods through Kenya;  
 Kenyan Revenue Authority (hereinafter referred to as “KRA”) imposes a double licens-
ing arrangement on trucks requiring that trucks licenced to carry only transit goods – 
such as most Ugandan trucks – have to return home empty; 
 certain Kenyan municipalities apply charges and fees from transiting trucks without 
legal grounds and 
 transit trucks carrying imports destined to Uganda have to travel in a convoy which is 
only formed three times a week. 
As a consequence of the aforementioned restrictions transit Ugandan traders have to pay con-
siderable additional costs88: Pursuant to Rodrigue, in 2009 the indirect and direct costs for the 
transport of a 20ft container from Mombasa to Nairobi amounted to over 40% of the total lo-
                                           
84
 Regional Trade Facilitation Programme Inventory of Regional Non-Tariff Barriers: Synthesis Report (2007), page 67; 
Ancharaz V et al The First Africa Region Review for EAC/COMESA (2010), pages 9 ff.; Arvis JF et al The Cost of Be-
ing Landlocked: Logistic Costs and Supply Chain Reliability (2010), page 44. For further details, please see Chapter 
B below.  
85  
Ancharaz V et al The First Africa Region Review for EAC/COMESA (2010), page 11. 
86
  Ihiga S Monitoring Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers in EAC (2009), page 60. 
87
  World Bank Non-Tariff Measures on Goods Trade in the EAC – Synthesis Report (2008), page v. 
88  
Ihiga S Monitoring Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers in EAC (2009), page 60. 
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gistics costs.89 In addition to that, Ugandan bound commercial vehicles through Kenya take on 
average about 7 days, while this time could be reduced to 2 days.90 
3.3.6. Conclusion 
The implementation of the Customs Union and the new Common External Tariff has raised 
prices on imports to Uganda from outside the EAC increasing production costs and lowering the 
respective capital returns.  
At the same time, Kenyan and Tanzanian competitors have gained access to the Ugandan 
market without any protection for Ugandan producers since no tariffs are applicable anymore 
within the EAC as of 2010.  
On the other hand the various trade facilitation initiatives of the EAC did not have the expected 
effect of lowering the trade costs significantly for Ugandan traders who are as a result thereof 
put at an additional, i.e. besides trading from a landlocked country, disadvantage towards their 
Kenyan or Tanzanian competitors.  
3.4. Possible legal action 
One way to force Kenya to abandon these restrictions could be to take legal action against the-
se practices before a court having jurisdiction, as the restrictions in place in Kenya could vio-
late the respective provisions under the relevant EAC Agreements and also under other inter-
national agreements, such as the law of the WTO, of which both Kenya and Uganda are mem-
bers. Taking legal actions against these Kenyan restrictions before one of the relevant courts 
could significantly lower the – direct and indirect – trade costs for Ugandan traders and thus 
support other initiatives by the Ugandan government to increase the economic development of 
Uganda.  
4. Research problem and methodology  
Uganda's ability to improve its transit of goods through Kenya by eradicating these Kenyan 
measures is limited. However, Kenya is under Article V of GATT 1994 obliged to guarantee 
freedom of transit for goods coming from or going to Uganda through the Northern Corridor. In 
the various Agreements of the EAC there is no explicit provision for the freedom of transit cor-
responding to Article V of GATT 1994, but Kenya undertook various obligations to guarantee 
the free movement of goods coming from or destined to Uganda.91 Therefore, Uganda could 
challenge these restrictions before the EAC Court of Justice.  
Reducing transit restrictions in Kenya for Ugandan goods through negotiations or – should the-
se be in vain – by using the available dispute settlement procedures would create a faster and 
cheaper transit of goods from or to Uganda through Kenya supporting the various other efforts 
of the Ugandan government and the EAC to facilitate trade in goods. Pursuant to multiple stud-
                                           
89
  Rodrigue JP et al The Geography of Transport Systems (2009). 
90  
Ihiga S Monitoring Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers in EAC (2009), page 60. 
91  For further details, please see Chapter 3 lit. 3 below.  
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ies, a cheaper and, in particular, faster transit through Kenya would lead to a significant in-
crease of the Ugandan trade volume: Djankov concludes that, on average, each additional day 
goods are delayed reduces trade by a minimum of 1%.92 According to a study by Limao and 
Venables, a general 10% decrease in transport cost is estimated to increase trade volumes by 
as much as 20%.93 Hence, even a smaller reduction in Ugandan costs for transiting through 
Kenya by taking legal action could result in a considerable increase of Ugandan trade and 
thereby help to support economic growth in Uganda leading to more revenues from taxation 
and reducing poverty in Uganda.  
Even though every day goods are transiting other countries all over the world to their final 
destinations, some of which are subject to certain restrictions, the first – and up to now the 
only – case in regard to Article V of GATT 1994 has been decided just recently by a WTO Pan-
el.94 The East African Court of Justice, too, has not decided such a case up to now: It even has 
not yet decided any trade dispute between two Partner States.  
The problems connected with transit of goods also have been mostly neglected in the respec-
tive literature so far: In most books about the law of the WTO, Article V of GATT 1994 has 
been left out completely or reference is only made to the text of the article.95  
In the following, this thesis will thus examine (i) what transit restrictions exist for the transport 
of Ugandan goods from and to the international market through Kenya (see Chapter 2 below); 
(ii) whether these measures adopted in Kenya are in compliance with the relevant law of the 
EAC (see Chapter 3 below) and of the WTO (see Chapter 4 below); and (iii) if there is a conflict 
in jurisdiction in this respect (see Chapter 5 below). In addition, it will then shortly show the 
current status of the current negotiations of the WTO Trade Facilitation Committee and the 
possible implications of the Revised Draft Negotiation Text (see Chapter 6 below).  
5. Scope  
Ugandan trade is also affected by various other measures adopted in Kenya, such as discrimi-
natory goods inspections, discriminatory technical standards enforcement, cumbersome docu-
mentary requirements for Ugandan exports to Kenya96 and the widespread corruption in Kenya. 
It would go beyond the scope of this thesis to examine all relevant measures constraining 
Ugandan trade.  
Furthermore, and for the same reason, the thesis will only examine the transit of goods under 
the EAC and WTO law and will not consider Article VIII GATT 1994 (Customs) or Article X of 
                                           
92  
Djankov S et al Trading on Time (2006), page 17; The World Bank Doing Business in the East African Community 
(2010), page 37; Njinkeu D et al 'Expanding trade with Africa – The impact of trade facilitation' (2008), page 14.  
93  
Limao N & Venables A 'Infrastructure, geographical disadvantage and transport costs' (2000).  
94  Panel Report Columbia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, WT/DS366/R, dated 27th April 2009. 
95
  Matsushita M et al The World Trade Organisation – Law, Practice and Policy (2003); Pryles M et al International 
Trade Law: Commentary and Materials, 2ed (2004); Petersmann EU International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO 
Dispute Settlement System (1997); Bhala R International Trade Law: Theory and Practice 2 edition (2001); World 
Trade Organization WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law and Practice (2007); Croome J Guide to the Uruguay 
Round Agreements (1999). 
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  Kenya is reluctant to accept certificates issued by the Ugandan Bureau of Standards, such as in the dairy industry. 
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GATT 1994, trade in services or the law of the other regional trade agreements such as (i) law 
of COMESA, (ii) the Northern Corridor Transit Agreement (dated 1985, hereinafter referred to 
as the “Northern Corridor Transit Agreement”) between Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and 
Zaire97 and (iii) the Central Corridor Transport Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Cen-
tral Corridor Agreement”) between Uganda, DR Congo, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania.98 The 
problem with these transit agreements is, however, that not all Partner States of the EAC are 
signatories to both agreements, e.g. Tanzania has not acceded the Northern Corridor Transit 
Agreement and thus cannot pursue any claims in case the transit of its traders is impeded on 
the Northern Corridor. The same applies to Kenyan traders and the Central Corridor Agree-
ment.  
The lack of accurate, relevant and up-to date data also needs to be noted. During the conduct-
ed research, there have been at most times contradictory data to certain measures and proce-
dures such as the costs for the transport of a container from Mombasa to Kampala, the time 
needed, the road conditions, the respective distance and, most importantly, the restrictions 
Ugandan traders face on this route. All attempts to clarify the data with various governmental 
and private organisations in Uganda via email have been – up to now – in vain. Therefore, only 
certain measures will be examined in this thesis, which have been affirmed by various sources.  
  
                                           
97  
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra-African 
Trade (2010), page 249. Zaire only acceded to the Northern Corridor Transit Agreement in 1987.  
98 
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra-African 
Trade (2010), page 250.  
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Chapter 2 - Restrictions on Ugandan trade dependant on transit of goods through 
Kenya 
 
Besides the 'general' restrictions of transport in Kenya, such as bad road or rail infrastructure, 
comprehensive documentary requirements and the widespread corruption at the numerous 
roadblocks and weigh-bridges, the transit of Ugandan goods through Kenya is furthermore 
subject to the following, sometimes discriminatory, measures adopted by Kenyan authorities:  
1. Restrictions at the port of Mombasa  
Ugandan traders face the following restrictions at the port of Mombasa when clearing their 
goods destined to Uganda:  
1.1. Delayed clearance of goods 
Due to the – for the most part – insufficient and slow working cranes to offload delivery ves-
sels traders spend a minimum of two weeks to one month to clear goods from the port.99 Pur-
suant to a report by the World Bank, the clearance of cargo destined for Uganda by the Kenya 
Port Authority (hereinafter referred to as the „KPA“) is, in addition to the usual lengthy clear-
ance, discriminatory: Transit goods spent on average 37,5 days in the port whereas containers 
destined to Kenya only spent on average 12,4 days in the port.100 In addition to that, ships 
also have to wait outside the harbour until they can clear their goods due to the insufficient 
port infrastructure, as a consequence of which shipping companies charge Ugandan traders 
high surcharges.  
However, recently, the average dwell time at the port of Mombasa has been reduced signifi-
cantly because of investment in the port infrastructure and due to implemented trade facilita-
tion measures such as increased capacity training and cooperation between the Kenyan au-
thorities involved. Pursuant to a recent newspaper article, cargo thus moves rather quickly 
from KPA facilities: In 2009 the port dwell time for goods destined for the Kenyan market was 
on average 5.9 days.101 Yet, according to the same article, the dwell time for transit cargo was 
still estimated for the same point in time to be on average 7.5 days.102 But pursuant to a 
newsletter of the Kenyan Shippers Association, there exists no discriminatory clearance prac-
tice at the port of Mombasa.103 Since the actual dwell time at the port could not be further 
clarified, it will not be considered in the following.  
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 Tumuhumbise C & Ihiga S A Survey of Non-Tariff-Barriers that affect Ugandan Imports and Exports within EAC 
and COMESA Countries (2007), pages 19, 26 and 44. 
100  
World Bank Non-Tariff Measures on Goods Trade in the EAC – Synthesis Report (2008), page 27. 
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Pursuant to the KPA 6.2 days, see Kenyan Port Authorities 'Mombasa ports remains a regional hub' (2009). 
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(2010).  
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1.2. Insufficient grace period before application of demurrage charges 
Imports through Mombasa port are subject to a demurrage charge in the amount of US$ 40 
per container and day, after lapse of a grace period of 30 days from the time they have en-
tered into a customs warehouse at or near the port.104 However, this grace period is not suffi-
cient given the fact, that goods normally have to stay in the port area for at least 30 days: It 
usually takes (i) more than 10 days for the trader to conclude the correspondence on a letter 
of credit; (ii) 10 days to clear the goods at the docks; and (iii) 10 days to complete the process 
of declaring the cargo to customs, pay duty and applicable shipping surcharges before the 
goods can be released.105  
Furthermore, the stored goods can – after lapse of the initial warehousing period of 21 days – 
only be re-warehoused for extra seven days.106 Given the average time needed to complete 
the clearances of goods at the port and the grace period for the goods to stay in the custom 
warehouse of 21 days is thus grossly insufficient and results in unjustified additional costs for 
Ugandan traders. Please note that Ihiga points out in a footnote that the warehousing period 
before demurrage charges imposed by Kenyan authorities has been extended to 30 days. Pur-
suant to a decision by the EAC Ministers, 107 Kenya agreed not to apply these demurrage 
charges on transit goods after 21 days. However, pursuant to Rodrigue, demurrage charges 
still form a considerable part of the transit costs.108 Due to the fact that the current procedure 
in regard to demurrage charges could not be further clarified as well, it will not be considered 
in the following.  
1.3. Auctioning of Ugandan goods after lapse of warehousing period 
It is also worth pointing out that the Kenyan customs authority is entitled to auction any ware-
housed goods after failure to remove goods from port area after the re-warehousing period of 
7 days. Many Ugandan bound vehicles are reported to have been auctioned for that reason.109  
2. Restrictions on the transit through Kenya 
In addition to that, the transport of Ugandan goods on the way through Kenya is subject to the 
following restrictions:  
                                           
104
  Tumuhumbise C & Ihiga S A Survey of Non-Tariff-Barriers that affect Ugandan Imports and Exports within EAC 
and COMESA Countries (2007), page 26; Ihiga Simon - Monitoring Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff Barri-
ers in EAC (2009), page 59.  
105
  Tumuhumbise C & Ihiga S A Survey of Non-Tariff-Barriers that affect Ugandan Imports and Exports within EAC 
and COMESA Countries (2007), page 26. 
106
  Ihiga S Monitoring Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers in EAC (2009), pages 59 f.; Tumuhumbise C 
& Ihiga S A Survey of Non-Tariff-Barriers that affect Ugandan Imports and Exports within EAC and COMESA 
Countries (2007), page 26.  
107 Dated 25 August 2006 (EAC/CM12/DC24), downloaded on 20 January 2011 at 
http://www.eac.int/council_decisions/sectorDecision.php?sectorID=CUSTOMS.  
108  
Rodrigue JP et al The Geography of Transport Systems (2009). 
109  
Ihiga Simon Monitoring Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers in EAC (2009), pages 59 f.; Tumuhum-
bise C & Ihiga S A Survey of Non-Tariff-Barriers that affect Ugandan Imports and Exports within EAC and COME-
SA Countries (2007), page 26.  
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2.1. Kenyan police only allows trucks registered in Kenya to transport goods des-
tined to Tanzania through Kenya 
Kenyan Police requires that all trucks carrying goods from Uganda to Tanzania through Kenya 
and vice versa have to be trucks registered in Kenya.110 As a consequence thereof, additional 
costs incur to Ugandan traders for hiring Kenyan transport companies instead of using their 
own trucks or hiring cheaper Ugandan transport companies. These additional costs also accrue 
for the necessary repacking of the goods. Another effect of this measure adopted by the Ken-
yan police is that Ugandan registered transporters are running out of business on Kenyan 
routes. 
2.2. No back haulage allowed by Kenya for Ugandan transit trucks 
Kenya issues transit licences for trucks to Ugandan transporters only allowing them to route 
Ugandan goods through Kenya, but not to return to Uganda with import cargo, i.e. they have 
to return empty (no back haulage).111 This leads to, transport costs escalating for Ugandan 
traders since the trucks cannot transport other cargo back to Uganda – as is common practice 
in the transport sector – to reduce the costs.  
2.3. Application of local council fees applied to Ugandan transit cargo 
Namanga District Council, Kajiado, has instituted fees for trucks passing by using an old Act 
which allows the council to levy fees. But, pursuant to that Act such levies may only be applied 
to locally produced goods and not to transit cargo.112 
3. Restrictions at the Kenyan border  
Kenyan Customs officers at border crossings in various cases continue applying national taxes, 
duties, regulations and procedures long after relevant rules are harmonised or abolished by the 
EAC Council of Ministers.113 In the past, for instance, Kenya used to carry out Pre-shipment 
Inspections under which a 2.75% Import Declaration Fee was applicable on the value of goods. 
Even though these Pre-shipment Inspections were abolished in July 2005, the fee was not re-
moved and is still applied by Kenyan customs.114 This Import Declaration Fee should have been 
abolished after the phase out of the Pre-Shipment Inspection. 
 
 
                                           
110  
Tumuhumbise C & Ihiga S A Survey of Non-Tariff-Barriers that affect Ugandan Imports and Exports within EAC 
and COMESA Countries – Final Report (2007), page 38; Ihiga S Monitoring Mechanism for Elimination of Non-
Tariff Barriers in EAC (2009), page 60.  
111  
World Bank Non-Tariff Measures on Goods Trade in the EAC – Synthesis Report (2008), page 29; Roberts A 'Ken-
ya: Congestion at Mombasa port to blame for slow pace of Kenya's growth into regional hub' (2010). 
112  
East African Business Council Current Trade Barriers within the East African Community (2010). 
113
  Ihiga S Monitoring Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers in EAC (2009), page 31. 
114
  Tumuhumbise C & Ihiga S A Survey of Non-Tariff-Barriers that affect Ugandan Imports and Exports within EAC 
and COMESA Countries (2007), page 15; Ihiga S Monitoring Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers in 
EAC (2009), page 59. 
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4. Conclusion 
Ugandan traders face a variety of obstacles in Kenya transporting their goods to or from the 
port in Mombasa such as, inter alia, the Kenyan practices to (i) auction Ugandan goods after 
lapse of the warehousing period, (ii) only allow trucks registered in Kenya to transport goods 
destined to Tanzania or Kenya, (iii) issue only one-way transit licences for Ugandan trucks, (iv) 
apply council levy fees for locally produced goods to goods in transit and (v) to apply abolished 
taxes at the Kenyan border.    
These Kenyan measures (all together hereinafter referred to as the “Kenyan restrictions”) 
make the transit of Ugandan goods through Kenya significantly more expensive: Either directly 
for additional payments, such as demurrage charges, local fees or no longer applicable taxes, 
or indirectly for (i) higher transportation prices since Ugandan freight-forwarders have to pass 
on the costs for the empty drive back or the repacking of goods on Kenyan trucks to the Ugan-
dan traders; (ii) for higher transportation prices since Ugandan traders have to hire Kenyan 
transporters to higher prices due to lack of competition; and (iii) for time lost for repacking the 
goods.  
As a consequence of this, Ugandan traders are less competitive with their competitors from 
Kenya. The same counts for the Ugandan economy. On the basis of these additional costs that 
have to be passed on to Ugandan consumers diminishing the purchasing power and consump-
tion levels of national residents, the return on capital required by investors to finance projects 
within Uganda declines and thereby negatively impacting Gross Domestic Product.  
However, the Ugandan influence in Kenya to abolish these obstacles is limited as it is relying 
on the goodwill of the Kenyan authorities. Thus, the only way to put pressure on Kenya is to 
initiate legal proceedings either before the EAC Court of Justice or a respective panel of the 
WTO, should these restrictions violate the law of the EAC or the WTO.   
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Chapter 3 - Compliance of these measures with the law of the EAC 
 
There is no explicit article in the various agreements of the EAC providing explicitly for free-
dom of transit in the EAC. Nevertheless, in several articles Kenya – as a signatory of the Trea-
ty, the Customs Union Protocol and the Common Market Protocol (all together hereinafter re-
ferred to as the „EAC Agreements“) – undertook inter alia (i) to guarantee the free movement 
of goods, (ii) to remove all non-tariff barriers, (iii) not to apply discriminatory measures to na-
tionals from Partner States, (iv) to facilitate trade as well as road transport and (v) to gradual-
ly reduce and finally eliminate non-physical barriers to road trade within the Community.115  
In the following, this thesis will first briefly establish the applicable set of rules for the interpre-
tation of these agreements and then present, in a second step, the main general objectives 
and principles of the EAC Agreements before it will examine, in a third step, whether or not 
Kenyan restrictions to the transit of Ugandan goods through Kenya comply with the Kenyan 
obligations under the EAC Agreements. 
1. Sources of law of the EAC 
The law of the EAC, in general terms, mainly comprises the internal law of the EAC and the 
main sources of international law116:  
 The internal law of the EAC consists of the Treaty, the EAC Agreements, Acts of the 
EAC organs such as the EAC Legislative Assembly, its Council and Summit as well as 
the decisions of the EAC Court of Justice;117  
 as an organisation based on international agreements also the main sources of inter-
national law, such as international treaties and conventions, customary law as well as 
general principles of law and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists, form a 
source of law of the EAC.118  
The different possible sources of EAC law, too, have been stated in Article 39(1) of the Cus-
toms Union Protocol, which explicitly refers to the Treaty, the Customs Union Protocol, regula-
tions and directives by the Council, applicable decisions by the Court, Acts of the Community 
enacted by the Legislative Assembly and relevant principles of international law as possible 
sources of the EAC Customs law.  
2. Application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  
To date, neither any preparatory materials exist nor do commentaries on the EAC Agreements 
available, or any decisions of the East African Court of Justice clarifying the interpretation of 
                                           
115
  For further details, please see Chapter 3 lit. 2.2 below.  
116  
Kafeero E 'Customs and trade facilitation in the East African Community' (2008), pages 93 f. 
117  
Kafeero E 'Customs and trade facilitation in the East African Community' (2008), pages 93 f. 
118  
See for example Article 38(1)(a) to (c) of the International Court of Justice Statute; Pauwelyn J Conflict of Norms 
in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (2003), pages 89 ff.  
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the EAC Agreements in this respect, i.e. in regard to non-tariff barriers. Up to now, no such 
case between two Partner States of the EAC has been decided yet.119   
Therefore, the common rules of interpretation for international treaties of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties120 (adopted 23 May 1969 and entered into force on the 27 January 
1980, hereinafter referred to as the „Vienna Convention“) are to be applied to interpret the 
EAC Agreements. The Vienna Convention is applicable as both Uganda and Kenya have ratified 
the Vienna Convention on 24 June 1988 respectively on 9 November 1988 and it entered into 
force in Uganda on 22 September 1988 and in Kenya on 7 February 1989.121 Furthermore, the 
requirements for application of the Vienna Convention are given in the present case: The EAC 
Agreements (i) are international agreements concluded between states in written form and 
governed by international law and (ii) have been concluded after the Vienna Convention has 
entered into force.122  
It has to be noted that even in case the parties of an international treaty have not signed the 
Vienna Convention, the relevant principles of this convention would nevertheless be applicable 
since they are recognised elements of international customary law.123  
2.1. Summary of the rules of the Vienna Convention 
The Articles of the Vienna Convention can be briefly summarized as follows124:  
 The provision to be interpreted first of all has to be broad and ambiguous enough to 
allow an interpretation;  
 interpretation is about giving the ordinary meaning to the terms of the treaty, in their 
context and in light of their object and purpose; 
 if the terms are still ambiguous or unreasonable after such an interpretation, recourse 
can be made to subsequent means of interpretation and the preparatory work as well 
as to any subsequent decisions and practices; and 
 it is not allowed to extend or to create new rules through interpretations. 
2.2. The general objectives and principles of the EAC Agreements 
The following main general objectives and principles govern the EAC Agreements and are, thus, 
to be considered when interpreting these agreements:  
                                           
119  Pursuant to www.eacj.org/judments.php, last checked on 2 September 2013.  
120
  United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331.  
121
  United Nations Environment Programme, status downloaded at http://ozone.unep.org/Ratification_status/ rat-
if_by_country.shtml?cntryname=Uganda and http://ozone.unep.org/Ratification_status/ rat-
if_by_country.shtml?cntryname=Kenya. 
122  See Article 1 and 2(a) of the Vienna Convention; Verosta S 'Die Vertragsrechts-Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen 
1968/69 und die Wiener Konvention über das Recht der Verträge' (1969), page 659.  
123
  Pryles M et al International Trade Law: Commentary and Materials, 2 edition (2004), page 123 (3.115); Peters-
mann EU International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (1997), page 330. 
124  Pauwelyn J Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International 
Law (2003), pages 244 ff.; Matsushita M et al The World Trade Organisation – Law, Practice and Policy (2003), 
pages 356 f. 
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2.2.1. Objectives of the EAC125 
The main objectives of the EAC are (i) to strengthen regional integration and development 
through a (ii) comprehensive co-operation between the Partner States in order to (iii) create 
an enabling environment for its citizens. This follows from the following provisions:  
 Pursuant to the Preamble of the Treaty, the Partner States of the EAC are „with a view 
to realising a fast and balanced regional development, resolved to creating an ena-
bling environment in all the Partner States in order to attract investments and allow 
the private sector and civil society to play a leading role in the socio-economic devel-
opment activities through the development of sound macro-economic and sectorial 
policies and their efficient management [...].“126  
 Article 5(1) of the Treaty determines the objectives of the EAC as to „develop policies 
and programmes aimed at widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner 
States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, de-
fence, security and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit.“  
 According to Article 2(1) of the Common Market Protocol, the Partner States establish 
amongst themselves a common market, with the objective to „accelerate economic 
growth and development of the Partner States through the attainment of the free 
movement of goods, persons and labour, the rights of establishment and residence 
and the free movement of services and capital.“127  
Economic development with the Partner States as a basis for social development, in particular 
the reduction of poverty,128 thus is one of the most important objectives of the EAC.  
2.2.2. Principles of the EAC 
These objectives of the EAC are backed up by various fundamental and operational principles 
in the Treaty governing their implementation, such as:  
 „the establishment of an export oriented economy for the Partner States in which there 
shall be free movement of goods, persons, labour, service, capital, information and 
technology;129  
 to observe the principle of non‐discrimination of nationals of other Partner States on 
grounds of nationality;130  
 to accord treatment to nationals of other Partner States not less favourable than the 
treatment accorded to third parties;131 
                                           
125
  Kafeero E 'Customs and trade facilitation in the East African Community' (2008), pages 91, 100 ff.  
126 
 Preamble of the Treaty, page 2 at the bottom. 
127
  Article 4(2)(a) of the Common Market Protocol. 
128  
See in this respect also Article 120(a) of the Treaty according to which „the Partner States undertake to co-
operate closely […] in employment, poverty alleviation programs and working conditions.“ 
129
  Article 7(1)(c) of the Treaty.  
130 
 Article 3(2)(a) of the Common Market Protocol.  
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 good governance;132  
 co-operation for the mutual benefit;133 and 
 the provision by the Partner States of an adequate and appropriate enabling environ-
ment, such as conducive policies and basic infrastructure.“134  
The drafters of the Treaty, too, were aware of the special situation of the landlocked countries. 
The Treaty thus stipulates that with regard to the co-operation in infrastructure and services 
„special treatment shall be granted to the landlocked Partner States.“135 This obligation has 
been further substantiated in Article 93(d) of the Treaty, pursuant to which „coastal countries 
shall co-operate with landlocked Partner States and grant them easy access to port facilities.“  
3. Compliance of the Kenyan restrictions with EAC law 
The Kenyan restrictions to the transit of Ugandan goods through Kenya could violate the Ken-
yan obligations under the EAC Agreements.  
3.1. Violation of the Kenyan obligation to co-operate in the implementation of cus-
toms requirements for the transit of goods 
The only provision in the EAC Agreements referring explicitly to transit of goods is Article 
4(2)(e) of the Customs Union Protocol according to which the Partner States undertake to co-
operate in „implementing the customs requirements for the transit of goods.“ 
However, pursuant to the clear wording, this article only provides for the claim of one Partner 
State against another for co-operation in regard to the implementation of customs require-
ments for the transit of goods. There is no place for a broader interpretation of this provision, 
such as an implicit guarantee of freedom of transit, because of the clear wording of this provi-
sion: Such a broad interpretation would go beyond the clear meaning of this article, it would 
be beyond the scope of interpretation and thus be inadmissible.  
In any case, Kenya has fulfilled its obligation under Article 4(2)(e) of the Customs Union Proto-
col with the ratification of the EAC Customs Management Act in 2004 (as amended in 2008, 
hereinafter referred to as the „Customs Management Act“) and the EAC Customs Management 
Regulations in 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the „Customs Management Regulations“), 
which regulate in detail the treatment applied by EAC customs to goods such as clearance of 
goods and other custom formalities, custom warehousing, importation and exportation. But, 
apart from these general customs procedures and practices, neither the Customs Management 
Act nor the Customs Management Regulations provide for a right for an unrestricted transit of 
goods through another Partner State.  
                                                                                                                                            
131  
Article 3(2)(b) of the Common Market Protocol.  
132
  Article 6(d) and Article 7(2) of the Treaty. 
133  
Article 6(f) of the Treaty. 
134
  Article 7(1)(b) of the Treaty.  
135  
Article 89 Sentence 2(e) of the Treaty. 
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Consequently, Uganda cannot claim from Kenya the elimination of the restrictions for its goods 
transiting through Kenya under Article 4(2)(e) of the Customs Union Protocol. 
3.2. Violation of the Kenyan obligation to eliminate non-tariff barriers on the impor-
tation of goods into the territory of a Partner State 
There are certain obligations within the EAC Agreements regarding the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers on the importation of goods into the territory of a Partner State, such as Article 75(5) 
of the Treaty pursuant to which the Partner States must “remove all the existing non-tariff 
barriers on the importation of the goods into their territory from the other Partner States“ or 
Article 13(1) of the Customs Union Protocol which has almost the same wording as Article 75(5) 
of the Treaty. However, the wording of these articles expressly only refers to the removal of 
non-tariff barriers on the 'importation of goods' within intra-EAC trade and therefore are not 
applicable in the present case: 
The importation of goods does not cover the transit of goods through another Partner State: 
Pursuant to its ordinary meaning, goods are imported into a state if they are brought in from a 
foreign country for use, sale, processing, re-export, or services.136 The term 'transit' in com-
parison can refer to two related concepts in the discussion of international trade137:  
 in the context of trade facilitation transit traffic refers in particular to the procedure of 
goods being moved through a territory with the beginning and the end of the transit 
operation being outside this territory (so-called international transit); 
 customs transit, in contrast, in the context of customs, refers to the procedures under 
which goods are transported under customs control from one customs office to anoth-
er under temporary suspension for the payment of duties and taxes.  
Since Article 75(5) of the Treaty and Article 13(1) of the Customs Union Protocol deal with 
trade facilitation measures, the first meaning of transit is applicable for the interpretation of 
these provisions. In any case, both the definitions of international transit and customs transit 
require that the transit goods leave the respective country. In contrast, imported goods remain 
in the country after they have been in transit, or they have to be directly brought to the coun-
try.  
Therefore, the importation of goods and the transit of goods refer to two different and, thus, 
incomparable cases. The wording of these articles is unambiguous and the respective provision 
is, thus, not open for interpretation. As a result, Uganda cannot claim the elimination of the 
Kenyan restrictions under Article 75(5) of the Treaty or Article 13(1) of the Customs Union 
Protocol.  
 
                                           
136
 "import" at Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House Inc., retrieved on 2 February 2011 at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browser/import.  
137  
United Nations Conference Trade and Development - 'Freedom of transit, regional transit agreements and cus-
toms transit' (2008), page 2.  
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3.3. Free movement of goods 
Furthermore, the Kenyan restrictions to the transit of Ugandan goods could violate its obliga-
tion pursuant to Article 6 of the Common Market Protocol. Article 6(1) of the Common Market 
Protocol reads as follows: “The free movement of goods shall be governed by the Customs Law 
of the Community as specified by Article 39 of the Protocol for the Establishment of the East 
African Customs Union.” 
3.3.1. Basis for a Ugandan claim  
Pursuant to its wording, Article 6(1) of the Common Market Protocol does not explicitly provide 
for an obligation of the Partner States to guarantee the free movement of goods, it rather im-
plies that such an obligation already exists: Instead of providing for a guarantee of the Partner 
States for the free movement of goods, as it is the case for example for the free movement of 
persons,138 workers139 and services,140 the right of establishment of nationals of the other Part-
ner States141 and the right of residence,142 where “the Partner States hereby guarantee” the 
respective freedoms, Article 6(1) of the Common Market Protocol merely states that the free 
movement of goods is to be governed by the customs law of the EAC as specified in Article 39 
of the Customs Union Protocol. Article 6(1) of the Common Market Protocol, thus, has to be 
read in connection with the Customs Union already existing between the Partner States. Article 
39 of the Customs Union Protocol reads as follows:  
1. “The customs law of the Community shall consist of:  
(a) relevant provisions of the Treaty;  
(b)  this Protocol and its annexes;  
(c)  regulations and directives made by the Council;  
(d)  applicable decisions made by the Court;  
(e)  Acts of the Community enacted by the Legislative Assembly; and 
(f)  relevant principles of international law.  
2. The customs law of the Community shall apply uniformly in the Customs Union ex-
cept as otherwise provided for in this Protocol.”  
As a consequence thereof, Article 6 of the Common Market Protocol is to be read as to only 
repeat and affirm the already existing obligations of the Partner States pursuant to the Cus-
toms Union Protocol.  
                                           
138
  Article 7(1) of the Common Market Protocol.  
139  
Article 10(1) of the Common Market Protocol.  
140
  Article 16(1) of the Common Market Protocol.  
141
  Article 13(1) of the Common Market Protocol.  
142  
Article 14(1) of the Common Market Protocol.  
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This reading of Article 6(1) of the Common Market Protocol is also confirmed by the prevailing 
theory of economic integration, according to which the establishment of a customs union and 
the one of a common market are subsequent stages of economic integration143 and, this is why, 
the latter necessarily requires the former.144  
So the free movement of goods is mandatory for a Common Market as it has already been 
granted under the preceding stage of the Customs Union. 
However, as stated above, the Treaty and the Customs Union Protocol do not provide explicitly 
in any article for the free movement of goods as is the case for the free movement of persons, 
services, etc. But these agreements stipulate in various provisions that customs duties and 
other charges of equivalent effect are to be eliminated and non-tariff barriers between the 
Partner States are to be removed:  
 Pursuant to Article 75(1)(c) of the Treaty, the Partner States are to establish a Customs 
Union, the respective Protocol must call for the elimination of non-tariff barriers. The 
Partner States fulfilled this requirement with the coming into force of the Customs Un-
ion Protocol in 2004, affirming this aim in the Preamble: „AND WHEREAS the Partner 
States are desirous to deepen and strengthen trade among themselves and are re-
solved to abolish tariff and non-tariff barriers to create the most favourable environ-
ment for the development of regional trade.“145  
Implementing this aim, Article 2(4) of the Customs Union Protocol therefore deter-
mines: “Within the Customs Union:  
a) customs duties and other charges of equivalent effect imposed on imports shall be 
eliminated save as is provided for in this Protocol;  
b) non-tariff barriers to trade among the Partner States shall be removed.“  
 In addition to that, the elimination of non-tariff barriers has also been provided for by 
the Partner States in other provisions of the EAC Agreements: In regard to non-tariff 
barriers for the importation of goods in the respective territories of goods originating in 
the other Partner States Article 13(1) of the Customs Union Protocol states that „each 
of the Partner States agrees to remove, with immediate effect, all the existing non-
tariff barriers to the importation into their respective territories of goods originating in 
the other Partner States and, thereafter, and not to impose any new non-tariff barri-
ers.“ And the Common Market Protocol too, provides for the elimination of tariff, non-
tariff and technical barriers of trade as well as the harmonisation and mutual recogni-
tion of standards.146  
                                           
143  
Such as Free Trade Agreement, Customs Union, Common Market and Economic Union.
  
144  
Delux T 'Essence and phases of international economic integration' (2010), pages 3 f.  
145
  Preamble of the Customs Union Protocol, page 2. 
146
  Article 5(2)(a) of the Common Market Protocol. 
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 The importance of the elimination of barriers to trade has furthermore been reaffirmed 
in the subsequently concluded Common Market Protocol, according to which “the Part-
ner States agree to eliminate tariff, non-tariff and technical barriers to trade; harmo-
nise and mutually recognize standards and implement a common trade policy for the 
Community” in order to achieve a free movement of goods.147 The Common Market 
Protocol is to be considered for the interpretation of Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Un-
ion Protocol pursuant to Article 31(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention since it is a subse-
quent agreement between the same parties as in the Customs Union Protocol and its 
subject is connected with it.  
These obligations of the Partner States to eliminate tariffs and to remove non-tariff barriers, 
however, describe the typical characteristics of the free movement of goods: Goods can only 
move freely through a country when they are able to circulate without any restrictions, i.e. 
without being subject to any charges or non-physical barriers, throughout the member states 
of the customs union. Since Article 2(4) of the Customs Union Protocol determines that cus-
toms duties and other charges are to be eliminated and non-tariff barriers shall be removed, it 
therefore provides implicitly for the free movement of goods. Article 2(4) of the Customs Union 
is also applicable since Article 6(1) of the Common Market Protocol refers to Article 39(1) (b) 
of the Customs Union Protocol which, in turn, determines that the provisions of the Customs 
Union Protocol form part of the EAC customs law.  
Consequently, Article 6(1) of the Common Market Protocol guarantees, in combination with 
Article 39(1)(b) and Article 2(4) of the Customs Market Protocol, for the free movement of 
goods.  
3.3.2. Requirements of Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol 
The aforementioned Kenyan restrictions to the transport of Ugandan goods transiting Kenya 
are not tariff restrictions, but non-tariff barriers since they are not applied at the border due to 
the importation of goods. According to Article 2(4) (b) of the Customs Union Protocol, Kenya 
has to remove all such barriers to trade.  
3.3.2.1. Definition non-tariff barrier 
The first question in regard to this provision is how the term non-tariff barriers is to be inter-
preted, i.e. what measures are subject to this obligation. In spite of a voluminous literature in 
international trade, there exists up to now no uniform definition of the terms “non-tariff 
measures” and “non-tariff barriers”.  
It has to be noted that in some cases these terms are used interchangeably.148 However, even 
though both terms cover the same types of measures or barriers, a distinction between both 
these terms is made in the discussion of international trade pursuant to the justification of the 
                                           
147
  Article 5(2)(a) in combination with Article 5(1) of the Common Market Protocol. 
148 
 Ferrantino M 'Quantifying the trade and economic effects of Non-Tariff Measures' (2006), page 5 (footnote 2). 
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respective barrier: (i) non-tariff measures are all barriers applied for legitimate reasons 
whereas (ii) non-tariff barriers, in contrast to that, are all barriers used as instruments of pro-
tection, i.e. who have an unjustified trade distorting effect.149  
Most definitions, however, agree that both these terms are to be defined as (i) measures other 
than tariffs that (ii) affect the flow of international transactions in goods and, in doing so, (iii) 
act as a barrier to trade.150 So, the definition of non-tariff measures and non-tariff barriers is 
relatively flexible. Various international trade organisations, such as the OECD, the UNCTAD or 
the WTO, have released catalogues for the classification of non-tariff measures with different 
main categories, such as government participation in trade, customs and administrative entry 
procedures, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, specific limita-
tion and quantitative restrictions, and intellectual property.  
Nevertheless, the question, which of these catalogues is to be applied, is not essential in this 
context since the Customs Union Protocol defines non-tariff barriers as „laws, regulations, ad-
ministrative and technical requirements other than tariffs imposed by a Partner State whose 
effect is to impede trade.“ 151 And pursuant to Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention this 
meaning given by the signatories is binding. The Kenyan restrictions, however, constitute such 
administrative requirements. 
3.3.2.2. Are 'transit barriers' barriers to trade?  
The second question in regard to Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol is namely, 
whether these restrictions also impede Ugandan 'trade', i.e. whether or not this provision also 
calls for the freedom of transit of goods through Kenya coming from or destined to Uganda. 
Should that be the case Kenya would be obliged to eliminate the respective non-tariff barriers.  
There exists no decision of the East African Court of Justice on the interpretation of the term 
'trade'. Therefore, this provision has to be interpreted according to Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, giving the ordinary meaning to its terms, in its context and in light of its object 
and purpose, and taking into consideration any subsequent decision and practices of the con-
tracting parties.  
a) The ordinary meaning of trade  
Pursuant to the dictionary, the term 'trade' is used to denote the activity of buying and 
selling, or exchanging goods or services between people or countries.152 According to 
this definition only the transaction between a buyer and a seller would be covered, for 
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Ferrantino M 'Quantifying the trade and economic effects of Non-Tariff Measures' (2006), page 7; Kirk R 
'Addressing trade restrictive non-tariff measures on goods trade in the East African Community' (2010), page 1; 
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which other legal frameworks exist already, such as the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,153 and not the transit of goods through 
another country, the meaning of which is in general the conveyance of people or goods 
from one place to another only.154  
But beyond that narrow definition of 'trade', this term can also be understood in a 
broader sense as the whole environment in which trade takes place, as for example in 
the context of trade facilitation where trade comprises all stages of the supply chain in-
cluding the transportation of the goods to their destination.155  
The ordinary meaning of the term 'trade' is thus ambiguous and therefore the further 
means of the Vienna Convention are to be applied.  
b) The context of Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol  
According to Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention also the context of the provision in 
question, i.e. the text of the treaty, including its preamble and annexes, as well as 
subsequent treaties between the parties relating to that treaty, is to be considered.  
 The Preamble of the Customs Union Protocol reads as follows: “The Partner States 
are desirous to deepen and strengthen trade among themselves and are resolved to 
abolish tariff and non-tariff barriers to create the most favourable environment for 
the development of regional trade.”156  
This Preamble calls for the 'creation of the most favourite environment for the de-
velopment' of regional trade. This indicates that the drafters of this protocol acted 
on the assumption of a broader definition of trade since the term 'environment' 
usually also comprises all stages of a process, from the production of the goods, 
their transportation, up to the actual sale of the goods.  
 This assumption of a broad interpretation of 'trade' is further supported by Article 1 
of the Customs Union Protocol, according to which 'trade facilitation' “means the co-
ordination and rationalisation of trade procedures and documents relating to the 
movement of goods from their place of origin to their destination.”157  
This definition of trade facilitation explicitly refers to the rationalisation of trade 
procedures relating to the movement of goods 'from their place of origin to their 
destination'. In a reverse conclusion, that means that the term 'trade' also has to 
cover all these stages and not only the sale of the goods.  
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 This interpretation of Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol is further 
backed up by Article 6(c) of the Customs Union Protocol which refers to the trans-
portation in the context of trade facilitation: “The Partner States shall initiate trade 
facilitation by ensuring adequate co-ordination and facilitation of trade and 
transport activities within the Community.” So also according to this provision 
transport activities in the EAC are an integral part of trade facilitation. 
 When interpreting Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol also Article 89 sen-
tence 2(e) of the Treaty is to be considered according to which the Partner States 
shall “grant special treatment to landlocked Partner States” in regard to the co-
operation in infrastructure and services.  
It has to be noted that Article 89 of the Treaty only refers to the respective chapter 
of the Treaty, i.e. the co-operation in infrastructure and services, and does not con-
stitute a general principle of the Treaty. However, the evaluation of this provision 
can be considered when interpreting other provisions of the Treaty or the subse-
quent agreements based thereon: This provision shows that the drafters of the 
Treaty were aware of the general problems of landlocked countries, i.e. the addi-
tional costs due to the longer transportation ways and the transit through other 
countries. A special treatment of the landlocked Partner States, however, requires a 
broad interpretation of the term 'trade', i.e. that their transport and transit costs 
are reduced by eliminating the respective non-tariff barriers in the transit countries. 
Therefore, also the call for a special treatment of landlocked countries indicates that 
the obligation to remove non-tariff barriers to trade also has to comprise the barri-
ers to the transit of goods.  
Thus, the context of Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol implies that the term 
'trade' in the Customs Union Protocol has to be understood in a broader sense, includ-
ing also the transport of goods from their place of origin to their final destination and 
therefore also the transit of goods on their way to their final destination.  
c)  The object and purpose of the Customs Union Protocol 
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention states that also the object and the purpose of a 
treaty need to be considered when interpreting a provision. The object and purpose of 
the Customs Union Protocol, however, also call for a broad interpretation of the term 
'trade', including the transit of goods.  
The objective of the Customs Union Protocol is to liberalise intra-regional trade within 
the EAC and to create an enabling environment for its traders in order to create eco-
nomic growth in the region. This results from the following obligations of the Partner 
States:  
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 The Preamble of the Treaty determines that the Partner States are resolved to cre-
ate an 'enabling environment' in all Partner States. According to Article 31(2)(a) of 
the Vienna Convention, the Treaty can be consulted for the interpretation of Article 
2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol: The conclusion of the Customs Union Proto-
col has already been provided for in the Treaty158 and the Customs Union Protocol 
refers in numerous provisions to the Treaty,159 so these agreements are to be con-
sidered as connected in terms of this provision. 
 This objective of creating an enabling environment in the EAC of the Treaty has also 
been reaffirmed in the Preamble of the Customs Union Protocol, stating that “the 
Partner States are desirous to deepen and strengthen trade among themselves and 
are resolved to abolish tariff and non-tariff barriers to create the most favourable 
environment for the development of regional trade.”160  
 According to the Customs Union Protocol, the Partner State thus must (i) promote 
the objectives of the Treaty,161 (ii) “further liberalise intra-regional trade in goods 
on the basis of mutually beneficial trade arrangements among the Partner 
States,”162 and (iii) “promote efficiency in production within the Community, and 
promote economic development and diversification in industrialisation in the Com-
munity.”163  
However, such a most favourable environment for the development of regional trade 
can only be achieved when the entire environment of trade is included, i.e. as well the 
transit of goods. If the transit of goods was covered by the obligations to eliminate 
trade barriers, the respective restrictions would continue to exist with the aforemen-
tioned negative consequences for landlocked countries,164 such as increased transport 
and production costs, making all efforts to facilitate trade within the EAC more difficult. 
Hence, also according to the object and purpose of Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Un-
ion Protocol, this provision has to be interpreted in a broad way as to include the trans-
it of goods on their way to their final destination.  
d) Subsequent decisions and practices 
Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention also provides for the consideration of any sub-
sequent decisions and practices between the signatories when interpreting a treaty. 
The term 'subsequent decisions' refers to any formal amendments or interpretative 
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notes concluded between the Partner States165 However, up to now, there exist neither 
any subsequent decisions nor any subsequent practices of any EAC organ in regard to 
Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol.  
e) Conclusion 
Consequently, Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol has to be interpreted in a 
broad way comprising the aggregate trade environment including the transit of goods 
through the Partner States.  
f) Beyond the limitations of interpretation?  
This interpretation of Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol does not go beyond 
the limitations of interpretation either: It does not create a completely new obligation 
for the Partner States, but only considers the object and purpose of the provision in 
question which is also expressed in Article 4(2)(e) of the Customs Union Protocol: Ac-
cording to this provision, the Partner States shall co-operate in the matters of trade fa-
cilitation “implementing the customs requirements for the transit of goods”. This refer-
ence implies that the drafters of the Customs Union Protocol assumed that transit is-
sues are part of trade facilitation and, therefore, in a reverse conclusion that the transit 
of goods also forms part of trade.  
It has to be noted that also pursuant to the established case law of the European Court 
of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the “ECJ”), the free movement of goods according 
to Articles 28 EC to 30 EC comprises goods in transit through a member state coming 
to or destined to another member state.166 According to the ECJ a customs union es-
tablished between states necessarily implies that the free movement of goods also 
comprises the freedom of transit: The free movement of goods also has to include the 
transport of goods transiting through one member state coming from or destined to 
another member state. Otherwise, trade between the various member states would be 
significantly impaired by increased transportation and production costs due to transit 
restrictions in other member states. It is therefore in the mutual interest of the Partner 
States, to acknowledge the existence of a general principle of freedom of transit of 
goods within a custom union.167  
This interpretation of the ECJ is not binding for the EAC Court of Justice, but it has an 
indicative effect since the same legal principles of economic integration are to be con-
sidered: Both the EAC and the EC are mandated to create a unified market and there-
fore acknowledge the principle of free movement of goods.  
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3.3.2.3. Conclusion  
Consequently, Article 2(4) (b) of the Customs Union Protocol calls for the elimination of any 
laws, regulations, administrative and technical requirements other than tariffs imposed by 
Kenya on transit of Ugandan goods whose effect is to impede trade.  
3.3.3. Consistency of the Kenyan measures restricting Ugandan transit through 
Kenya under Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol 
As shown above, the transit of Ugandan goods through Kenya is subject to various restrictions 
in Kenya,168 which could be inconsistent with Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol. 
3.3.3.1. Auctioning of goods after lapse of re-warehousing period 
The auctioning of Ugandan goods stored in Kenyan warehouses at the port of Mombasa by the 
Kenyan customs after lapse of the re-warehousing period is inconsistent with Article 2(4)(b) of 
the Customs Union Protocol and also not justified under Article 36(1) of the Customs Union 
Protocol. 
a) Violation of Article 2(4) (b) of the Customs Union Protocol 
The auctioning of goods which remain in the warehouse after the respective re-
warehousing period has lapsed, i.e. 30 days after they have been warehoused, by Ken-
yan customs is the most serious thinkable impairment to trade: The Ugandan traders 
lose the stored goods and have to reorder them as a consequence of which they cannot 
deliver the goods in time to their customers and even may become liable towards them. 
This administrative Kenyan practice thus impedes Ugandan trade in the most significant 
way.  
b) Justification according to Article 36(1) of the Customs Union Protocol 
However, this restriction of Ugandan traders could be justified pursuant to Article 36(1) 
of the Customs Union Protocol.169 Please note that the wording of this provision exactly 
corresponds with Article 78(1) of the Treaty. Yet, in the following, reference will only be 
made to Article 36 of the Customs Union Protocol as the provision being closer in sub-
stance.  
The requirements of Article 36(1) of the Customs Union Protocol are not given in the pre-
sent case: There is neither a serious injury nor a threat thereof to the Kenyan economy 
apparent through the application of the Treaty, i.e. the elimination of the respective Ken-
yan measures, nor would the auctioning of the goods be a necessary safeguard measure.  
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aa) No serious injury of threat thereof 
From its ordinary wording, a threat is in general given, if there is a high degree of 
likelihood that an anticipated danger materialises in the near future whereas an 
injury is present in case the anticipated danger already has materialised itself. 
There is no danger apparent to the Kenyan economy through the extension of the 
remaining of the Ugandan goods in the Kenyan warehouses at the port which 
could materialise in the future or which has already done so. As far as Kenya 
claims the congestion of the port as such endangers its economic development it 
has to be noted that the congestion has decreased significantly within the last 
years and the impact thereof on the Kenyan economy is quite limited.  
But even if one would assume that such an injury or the threat thereof would be 
given in this case, there would still be a lack of the requirement of the seriousness 
of the injury or the threat. According to its ordinary wording the term serious has 
the meaning of grave in nature or disposition or worthy of regard because of sub-
stantial quantity or quality.170 The term 'serious' injury or threat is ambiguous 
since it is not clear from the wording to which extent the economy has to be in-
jured or threatened in order to be seriously threatened or endangered, i.e. there 
exists a range of interpretation. However, considering the exceptional character of 
this provision, it has to be defined narrowly as a significant overall impairment of 
the economy in question.  
Article 36 of the Customs Union Protocol is located in Part I of the Customs Union 
Protocol, the General Provisions. The context of this provision is thus not really 
helpful for the interpretation. In this miscellaneous context, it provides for a gen-
eral exception allowing a Partner State in certain circumstances – after informing 
the EAC Council (hereinafter referred to as the “Council”) – the implementation of 
the necessary safeguard measures, which would be otherwise forbidden under the 
Customs Union Protocol. The object and purpose Article 36 of the Customs Union 
Protocol is therefore to provide for temporary flexibility for the Partner States in 
case their economy is threatened to be seriously harmed or injured by the imple-
mentation of the regulations of the Customs Union Protocol. However, it is a gen-
erally accepted principle of legal interpretation that exceptional provisions, such as 
Article 36 of the Customs Union Protocol, have to be interpreted as narrowly as 
possible.171 Otherwise, the Partner States could justify any protective measure 
even though the respective impact to its economy would only be insignificant and 
thus open this provision for misuse for protective purposes.  
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In other words, this Kenyan restriction could only be justified pursuant to Article 
36 of the Customs Union Protocol, if the Kenyan economic development with the 
remaining of the Ugandan goods in the warehouses for an extended time period in 
the near future was significantly worse than without them. However, there is no 
reason apparent how the remaining of the stored goods in the warehouses for a 
longer time period could lead to such a significant overall impairment of the Ken-
yan economy.172  
In addition to that, finally, it has to be noted that the burden of proof, that a 
threat to the Kenyan economy exists due to the further remaining of Ugandan 
goods in the warehouses, would be on Kenya173  And, in addition, Kenya would 
need to present this threat to be credible, i.e. it must be given from the stand-
point of a reasonable, similar situated government. The latter requirement of Arti-
cle 36 of the Customs Union Protocol follows again from the exceptional character 
of that provision: Otherwise it could be abused by a Partner State to justify almost 
any (discriminatory) practice on unreasonable grounds.  
bb) Not a necessary safeguard measure 
But even supposing that such a serious threat would be given in the present case, 
the Kenyan action would in any case not be 'necessary' in the sense of Article 
36(1) of the Customs Union Protocol.  
The term 'necessary' again has to be examined in its ordinary meaning, in its con-
text and in the light of the object and purpose of Article 36(1) of the Customs Un-
ion in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.  
'Necessary' in its ordinary meaning denotes something that is indispensable to 
some purpose,174 i.e. it describes the relationship between a condition and a goal. 
Therefore, this term is ambiguous since different ranges of degrees of necessity 
are applicable175: It can have the meaning of an 'absolutely essential' condition for 
the achievement of that goal or, on the other side of this range, of 'needed', i.e. 
simply making a contribution to achieve the goal.  
As an exceptional provision, Article 36 of the Customs Union Protocol has to be in-
terpreted as narrow as possible176 to avoid the misuse of this provision for protec-
tive purposes. Therefore, a measure is only 'necessary' if it is absolutely essential 
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to protect the Kenyan economy, i.e. in case there are no other measures at hand 
which are equally suitable to achieve this purpose and are less restrictive to trade.  
Even if one would assume an urgent need of Kenya to recover its costs for the 
warehousing of the Ugandan goods if a trader does not pay the respective charges 
or only a limited amount of space in these warehouses, there would be other 
means available which restrict the Ugandan trade in a lesser way: for example the 
Ugandan owners of the goods could be given a last chance to avoid the auctioning 
of the goods by giving them notice of that possibility giving them a last chance to 
pay their debts and to remove the goods as provided for in the Customs Manage-
ment Act. In regard to the congestion of the port, Kenya could alternatively also 
improve and extend the existing port and rail infrastructure, which is in most cas-
es responsible for the long stay of the goods in the warehouses. Last but not least, 
Kenya could also build additional warehouses.   
There is, thus, no apparent reason as to why the Ugandan goods remaining longer 
in Kenyan warehouses without the automatic possibility to auction could harm the 
Kenyan economy.  
This frequent practice of the Kenyan customs, however, can in any case not be 
necessary pursuant to Article 36 of the Customs Union Protocol, as it is itself in-
consistent with Article 42(1) of the Customs Management Act, according to which 
the customs are entitled to auction the goods after lapse of a 30 days warehous-
ing period in case (i) the Commissioner has given notice by public gazette and (ii) 
the goods have not been removed within 30 days after this notice. It is a general 
principle of international law that a measure encroaching in a right of another 
state can only be justified if that measure itself is consistent with the relevant ap-
plicable national law. A measure inconsistent with Kenyan law, therefore, cannot 
be a valid defence under Article 36 of the Customs Union Agreement. 
cc)  Conclusion 
Consequently, the entitlement of the Kenyan customs to auction Ugandan goods 
after lapse of the re-warehousing period without any further requirements and the 
respective Kenyan practice to do so constitutes an unjustified non-tariff barrier to 
Ugandan transit through Kenya and, thus, also to Ugandan trade.  
Therefore, Kenya is obliged under Article 2(4) (b) of the Customs Union Protocol 
to eliminate the laws and regulations pursuant to which the Kenyan customs are 
entitled to automatically auction the Ugandan goods after lapse of the re-
warehousing period.  
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3.3.3.2. Kenyan police only allows trucks registered in Kenya to transport goods 
destined to Tanzania through Kenya 
The frequent practice of the Kenyan police that only trucks registered in Kenya are allowed to 
transport goods destined to Tanzania on their way through Kenya also constitutes a significant 
impediment to Ugandan trade: Ugandan traders cannot use their own trucks or hire possibly 
cheaper Ugandan transporters but have to hire Kenyan transporters at least for the transport 
through Kenya. This results in additional costs for Ugandan traders for time lost repacking the 
goods or for the engagement of more expensive Kenyan transporters as a consequence of 
which Ugandan carriers run out of business on these routes. 
This practice of the Kenyan police is also not justified under Article 36 of the Customs Union 
Protocol. There is no apparent reason why the transport of goods through and in Kenya by 
non-Kenyan freight-forwarders can threaten to cause a serious harm to the Kenyan econo-
my177: The Kenyan transport industry is competitive and holds a significant share of the re-
gional market.178 There is also no sign that this sector is in danger by its international competi-
tion.  
3.3.3.3. No back haulage allowed by Kenya for transit trucks 
The issuance of transit licences to Ugandan transporters, which forbids them to transport 
goods on their way back, also is an unjustified impediment to Ugandan trade. This practice 
leads to higher transportation prices for Ugandan traders due to additional costs and time lost 
for repacking or higher prices to be paid to more expensive Kenyan freight-forwarders. As a 
consequence thereof, Ugandan traders are less competitive than their Kenyan competitors.  
This Kenyan ban for Ugandan transporters to transport goods on the way back is also not justi-
fied pursuant to Article 36 of the Customs Union Protocol. There is no serious threat to the 
Kenyan transport sector and thus its economy apparent.179  
3.3.3.4. Application of local council fees on transit cargo 
The application of local council fees to transit cargo as well is impairment to Ugandan trade 
increase transportation costs of Ugandan traders and thereby reducing their competitiveness.  
This Kenyan practice as well cannot be justified under Article 36 of the Customs Union Protocol, 
as the respective act, which the application of this fee is based on by the council, only allows 
the council to impose fees on locally produced goods180 and is thus on its face not applicable to 
transit goods.  
3.3.3.5. Application of abolished taxes to Ugandan goods at the Kenyan border  
The application of abolished taxes at the Kenyan border by the Kenyan customs also is an un-
justified impediment to Ugandan trade. The amounts paid feed into Ugandan prices reducing 
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their competitiveness. And since the respective taxes have been abolished in Kenya this prac-
tice cannot be justified under Article 36 of the Customs Union Protocol.181  
3.3.4. Conclusion 
The obligation under Article 2(4) (b) of the Customs Union Protocol to remove all tariffs and 
barriers to trade, also calls for the freedom of transit as part of the free movement of goods. 
The Kenyan measures are unjustified impediments to Ugandan transit through Kenya and thus 
also to Ugandan trade and therefore violate the Kenyan obligations under Article 2(4)(b) of the 
Customs Union Protocol. 
3.4. Violation of the obligation to eliminate non-physical barriers to road transport 
Furthermore, the Kenyan restrictions could also be inconsistent with the Kenyan obligations 
under Article 90 of the Treaty.  
In addition to the guarantee of free movement of goods, the Partner States undertook to co-
operate in road infrastructure and services. Article 89 sentence 1 of the Treaty reads as follows: 
„The Partner States undertake to evolve coordinated, harmonised and complementary 
transport and communications policies; improve and expand the existing transport and com-
munication links; and establish new ones as a means of furthering the physical cohesion of the 
Partner States, so as to facilitate and promote the movement of traffic within the Community.“ 
These obligations are further substantiated in Article 90 of the Treaty, according to which “the 
Partner States shall: [...] 
 establish common measures for the facilitation of road transit traffic;182 [...] 
 gradually reduce and finally eliminate non-physical barriers to road transport within 
the Community;183  
 ensure that common carriers from other Partner States have the same opportunities 
and facilities as common carriers in their territories in the undertaking of transport op-
erations within the Community;184  
 ensure that the treatment of motor transport operators engaged in transport within 
the Community from other Partner States is not less favourable than that accorded to 
the operators of similar transport from their own territories;185 and  
 make road transport efficient and cost effective by promoting competition and intro-
ducing regulatory framework to facilitate the road haulage industry operations.“186  
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The Partner States shall furthermore initiate trade facilitation by „ensuring adequate co-
ordination and facilitation of trade and transport activities within the Community.“187  
Article 90(s) of the Treaty provides for the gradual reduction and final elimination of non-
physical barriers to road transport within the EAC.  
a) Non-physical barriers 
First of all, the meaning of the term non-physical barrier has to be clarified. From its ordi-
nary meaning, the term 'non-physical barriers' refers to all barriers to the movement of 
goods which are not related to the existing infrastructure such as bad roads, i.e. it com-
prises mainly laws, regulations and practices impeding the transport of goods, such as the 
payment of tariffs, duties or charges.188 Pursuant to Article 90(s) of the Treaty, Kenya is 
therefore obliged to gradually reduce and finally eliminate all unjustified statutory, admin-
istrative and regulatory norms in regard to the movement of goods or discriminatory appli-
cation thereof.  
b) Reduction and final elimination 
These non-physical barriers are to be reduced and then finally eliminated by Kenya pursu-
ant to Article 90(s) of the Treaty. However, over the last years Kenya has reduced some 
non-physical barriers, for example it (i) has invested in the port of Mombasa and its road 
infrastructure;189 (ii) is reducing fees and charges at the port of Mombasa;190 (iii) reduced 
the amount of static and mobile weigh-bridges;191 (iv) is introducing an electronic cargo 
tracking system;192 (v) has started an anti-corruption initiative;193 and (vi) has introduced 
joint one-border posts with Uganda.194 Therefore, Kenya is already gradually reducing the 
existing non-physical barriers and, as a result, complying with its obligations under Article 
90(s) first alternative, even though there still exist various others restrictions.  
The problem with Article 90(s) second alternative of the Treaty is that it does not state a 
time limit until when the respective non-physical barriers have to be finally eliminated by 
the Partner States. It only states that they have to be “gradually reduced and finally elimi-
nated”. It would go beyond the clear meaning of the article in question to include a certain 
time limit for the elimination of these non-physical barriers by way of interpretation. Con-
sequently, there is no space for such an interpretation of Article 90(s) of the Treaty.  
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c) Conclusion 
Therefore, Uganda also cannot claim from Kenya the elimination of the restrictions for its 
goods transiting on road through Kenya under Article 90(s) of the Treaty. 
3.5. Violation of the obligation to provide the same opportunities for carriers 
Article 90(t) of the Treaty obliges Kenya to ensure that carriers from other Partner States have 
the same opportunities as domestic carriers in the undertaking of transport operations.  
a) Kenyan police only allows trucks registered in Kenya to transport goods des-
tined to Tanzania through Kenya 
The frequent practice by the Kenyan police to only allow Kenyan registered trucks to 
transport goods through Kenya is inconsistent with Article 90(t) of the Treaty. Ugandan 
transporters are disadvantaged towards their Kenyan competitors since their opportuni-
ties to offer and provide their services in Kenya are limited by this practice. Kenyan 
transporters, in contrast to Ugandan carriers, can provide their services without any re-
strictions in Kenya and all over the region as a consequence of which carriers from the-
se two countries do not have the same opportunities.  
b) No back haulage allowed by Kenya for transit trucks 
The ban on Ugandan carriers to transport goods on their way back to Uganda, when on-
ly a transit licence has been issued, also discriminates Ugandan carriers and is, there-
fore, inconsistent with Article 90(t) of the Treaty: This requirement does not apply to 
Kenyan carriers who can transport goods on each way without any limitations. As a 
consequence thereof, the Kenyan carriers can offer their services at lower prices than 
their Ugandan competitors because they do not have to charge the empty drive back to 
their customers. Therefore, Ugandan carriers do not have the same opportunities as 
their Kenyan counterparts.  
c) No justification under Article 36 of the Customs Union Protocol 
Both these practices are not justified by Article 36 of the Customs Union Protocol. Nei-
ther is there a serious harm to the Kenyan economy or threat thereof apparent nor 
would these Kenyan measures be necessary to prevent such harm.195  
3.6. Violation of the national treatment obligation for transport operators 
According to Article 90(u) of the Treaty, the Partner States must, furthermore, ensure that 
motor transport operators from other Partner States are treated not less favourable than the 
operators of similar transport from their own territories.  
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a) Kenyan police only allows trucks registered in Kenya to transport goods des-
tined for Tanzania through Kenya 
This practice by the Kenyan police discriminates Ugandan transporters since they are 
treated less favourably than their Kenyan competitors who can provide their services 
unrestrictedly within Kenya. It is therefore inconsistent with Article 90(t) of the Treaty.  
b) No back haulage allowed by Kenya for transit trucks 
This Kenyan practice discriminates Ugandan carriers and is, therefore, inconsistent with 
Article 90(u) of the Treaty: Ugandan carriers are treated less favourably than their Ken-
yan competitors who can transport goods also on their way back without any limitation 
and thus have lower costs which they can pass on to their clients.  
c) No justification under Article 36 of the Customs Union Protocol 
The Kenyan restrictions cannot be justified by Kenya under Article 36 of the Customs 
Union Protocol. Neither is there a serious harm to the Kenyan economy or a threat of 
apparent in this respect nor would these Kenyan measures be necessary to prevent 
such harm.196  
3.7. Violation of the obligation to provide for an efficient and cost effective road 
transport 
The Kenyan practice not to allow Ugandan carriers to transport goods on their way back to 
Uganda in case only a transit licence has been issued could also be inconsistent with Article 
90(v) of the Treaty, according to which the Partner States shall make road transport efficient 
and cost effective by promoting competition and introducing regulatory frameworks to facilitate 
road haulage operations. The question to be asked in this respect is to which extent Kenya has 
to 'promote competition'.  
In general, competition law and policy is aimed at creating and maintaining functioning mar-
kets which allow firms to take advantage of business opportunities and ensure that economic 
efficiency is given to the fullest extent.197 On that basis, the state has to ensure that private 
strategies, such as (i) collusive agreements between companies with regard to price fixing or 
market-sharing cartels, (ii) abuses by leading companies to drive out competitors or prevent 
entry of potential competitors and (iii) undue concentration, do not hinder competition.198 
However, according of Article 90(v) of the Treaty, the Partner States have to 'promote' compe-
tition. Pursuant to its ordinary meaning, promote means the 'contribution to the progress, 
prosperity or growth of something'.199 This implies that the Partner States have to make com-
prehensive efforts to promote competition, in particular to take an active role in the promotion 
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of competition which goes beyond the introduction of a competition act. Therefore, under this 
provision Kenya is obliged to promote competition within the EAC by cracking down on private 
Kenyan restrictive business practices and is obliged to omit all restrictions to trade which may 
have a competition distorting effect.  
The Kenyan practices not to allow Ugandan trucks to transport goods in Kenya since they are 
not registered there and not to allow Ugandan carriers to transport goods on their way back in 
case only a transit licence has been issued, have a competition distorting effect: Ugandan 
transporters can only offer and provide their services in Kenya in a limited way and have high-
er costs than their Kenyan competitors.200  
These practices are also not justified according to Article 36 of the Customs Union Protocol.201  
As a consequence thereof, the Kenyan practices, only to allow trucks registered in Kenya to 
transport goods between Tanzania and Uganda in Kenya and not to allow Ugandan trucks to 
transport goods on their way back if only a transit licence has been issued, are also incon-
sistent with Article 90(v) of the Treaty.  
3.8. Violation of Article 75(4) of the Treaty 
In addition to that, the Partner States also undertook not to impose any new duties and taxes 
or to increase the existing ones with respect to the goods traded within the EAC.  
Article 75(4) of the Treaty determines that „with effect from a date to be determined by the 
Council, the Partner States shall not impose any new duties and taxes or increase existing 
ones in respect of products traded within the Community and shall transmit to the Secretariat 
all information on any tariffs for study by the relevant institutions of the Community.“  
a) Application of local Council fees 
However, from its wording, Article 75(4) of the Treaty only refers to duties and taxes in 
regard to products traded within the EAC and thus do not apply to goods transiting one 
Partner State. Therefore, it does not apply to the local council fees for the passing 
through the Namanga district.  
b) Application of abolished taxes at the border 
Article 75(4) of the Treaty also does not apply to the frequent practice at the Kenyan 
border to apply abolished taxes to Ugandan goods: These taxes are not 'new duties or 
taxes' within the meaning of this provision: According to its ordinary meaning, 'new' du-
ties and taxes have not existed before. Also, the context and the object and purpose of 
that provision argue against the application of Article 75(4) of the Treaty: Article 75 of 
the Treaty obliges the Partner States to establish within four years after the coming into 
force of the Treaty a customs union among them and calls for certain requirements for 
this customs union. In preparation of this customs union the Partner States undertake, 
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for example, not to enact discriminatory legislation or to apply discriminatory adminis-
trative measures202 or to remove all existing non-tariff barriers to the importation of 
goods into their territory.203 Therefore, the objective and purpose of these provisions is 
to be seen as to provide for a minimum protection in the time period between the com-
ing into force of the Treaty and the Customs Union Protocol. Hence, it has to be inter-
preted narrowly as to only refer to new and legitimate duties and taxes, i.e. such in ac-
cordance with the national legislation, applied at the border. As a consequence thereof, 
the application of abolished taxes does not violate the Kenyan obligations under Article 
75(4) of the Treaty.  
3.9. Violation of Article 2(4)(a) of the Customs Union Protocol 
This obligation under Article 75(4) of the Treaty has been further substantiated in Article 
2(4)(a) of the Customs Union Protocol, according to which „within the Customs Union customs 
duties and other charges of equivalent effect imposed on imports shall be eliminated save as is 
provided for in this Protocol.”  
a) Application of local Council fees 
However, Article 2(4)(a) of the Customs Union Protocol is not applicable in case of the 
local council fees introduced in Namanga District since these fees are not charges im-
posed on 'imports' but only on the journey through the respective area. Yet, such “toll 
charges” are not comprised by Article 2(4)(a) of the Customs Union Protocol: Pursuant 
to Article 1 of the Customs Union Protocol, customs duties are defined as “import or ex-
port duties and other charges of equivalent effect levied on goods by reason of their 
importation or exportation, respectively, on the basis of legislation in the Partner States 
and includes fiscal duties or taxes where such duties or taxes affect the importation or 
exportation of goods but does not include internal duties and taxes such as sales, turn-
over or consumption taxes, imposed otherwise than in respect of the importation or ex-
portation of goods.”204 Since these council fees are based neither on the importation nor 
on the exportation of goods, this provision is not applicable. 
b) Application of abolished taxes at the border 
The application of abolished taxes at the border could be 'other charges of equivalent 
effect' within the meaning of Article 2(4)(a) of the Customs Union Protocol which are 
defined as “any tax, surtax, levy or charge imposed on imports and not on like locally 
produced products and does not include fees and similar charges commensurate with 
the cost of services rendered.”205 But under Article 2(4)(a) of the Customs Union Proto-
col only such customs duties and charges which are 'based on the legislation' in the 
Partner State have to be eliminated. Since these taxes have already been abolished 
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they are no longer to be applied at the border and therefore not 'based on the Kenyan 
legislation'. Such illegitimate demands for payments are comparable with the demand 
at the border to pay bribes. But, the object and purpose of Article 2(4)(a) of the Cus-
toms Union Protocol is to prevent any impediments to intra-EAC trade through the in-
troduction of duties and charges or the increase thereof for protectionist purposes. Such 
illegitimate demands for payments, however, fall under other provisions of the EAC 
Agreements, such as Article 2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol. 
c) Conclusion  
Uganda therefore does not have any claims against Kenya under Article 75(4) of the 
Treaty and Article 2(4)(a) of the Customs Union Protocol because of the local council 
fees or the application of abolished taxes at the border.  
4. Conclusion 
Article 6(1) of the Common Market Protocol calls in combination with Article 39 and Article 
2(4)(b) of the Customs Union Protocol for the free movement of goods and, in doing so, also 
for the freedom of transit within the EAC.  
According to these provisions all laws, regulations, administrative and technical requirements – 
other than tariffs – imposed by Kenya on transit of Ugandan goods in transit are to be abol-
ished by the respective Partner States.     
The Kenyan restrictions to Ugandan transit through Kenya are inconsistent with the free 
movement of goods as stipulated under the law of the EAC.  
In addition to that, the ban of Ugandan carriers to transport goods on their way back if only a 
transit licensce has been issued to them and the frequent practice of the Kenyan police not to 
allow trucks which are not registered in Kenya to transport goods are also inconsistent with 
Article 90(t), Article 90(u) and Article 90(v) of the Treaty. 
Thus, Uganda could initiate proceedings in front of the EAC Court of Justice against Kenya in 
order to eliminate the Kenyan restrictions.  
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Chapter 4 - Consistency of the Kenyan restrictions with Article V of GATT 1994 
 
In contrast to the EAC Agreements, GATT of 1994 contains with Article V a provision which 
explicitly deals with goods in transit. As the title 'freedom of transit' indicates, Article V of 
GATT 1994 calls for freedom of transit through the territory of each member to or from the 
territory of another member on the most convenient route. In addition to that, it also regulates 
(via Article V:2 to V:4 of GATT 1994) which conditions a member can impose to goods transit-
ing through its territory to a foreign destination: These conditions must (i) not cause any un-
necessary delays or restrictions to traffic in transit; (ii) not impose any unreasonable charges; 
and (iii) accord the same treatment to transiting goods of all Members. Article V of GATT 1994 
is applicable in the present case since both Kenya and Uganda are Members of the WTO.206  
The Kenyan restrictions could thus also be inconsistent with the Kenyan obligations under Arti-
cle V of GATT 1994. Should this be the case, Uganda would be entitled to request consultations 
with Kenya in accordance with Article XXII:1 of GATT 1994 and – should these be in vain – 
request the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article 4.7.f. of the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes of the WTO (also sometimes called Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding, hereinafter referred to as the „DSU“).  
Up to now, there exists only one panel decision in regard to Article V of GATT 1994 so the 
drafting history of this agreement could be important for the interpretation of this provision.   
1. Negotiating history of Article V of GATT 1994 
There have been several attempts to regulate the traffic in transit before Article V of GATT 
1994 came into force. The first legal framework in this respect was the Convention and Statute 
on Freedom of Transit or the so-called Barcelona Convention (hereinafter referred to as the 
„Barcelona Convention“),207 which dealt with the conditions a state could apply to goods trans-
iting through its territory destined for another state. The wording of Article V:1 and V:2 2nd 
sentence of GATT 1994 is even based on the corresponding provisions of the Barcelona Con-
vention.208  
In 1944, a conference was held on the establishment of a post-war international trading sys-
tem in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire (the so-called „Bretton Woods Conference“) where the 
founding of international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and also of the International Trade Organisation (also called „ITO“) was discussed.209 Part of 
these negotiations regarding the founding of the ITO was also the freedom of transit: The 
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United States of America presented a 'Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organisa-
tions of the United Nations' which, in Article 10, called for the freedom of transit. The Technical 
Subcommittee subsequently commented this draft text of the United States in a report.210 With 
respect to Article 10 of the Suggested Charter, this report points out that the Barcelona Con-
vention's definition of traffic in transit was taken into account during these negotiations.211  
These negotiations were continued by about 23 countries in Lake Success, New York, and Ge-
neva in 1947. On the Geneva conference, inter alia, the preparation of a draft ITO charter, 
schedules for tariff reductions as well as a multinational treaty providing for the general princi-
ples of trade was decided. The negotiations regarding the latter two were completed by the 
end of 1947, whereas the final work on the draft ITO charter was postponed to the following 
year.212  
Another negotiation round was held between November 1947 and March 1948 in Havana 
where in particular the draft ITO charter was to be discussed. Article 33 of the so-called draft 
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation (hereinafter referred to as the „Havana 
Charter“) dealt with the freedom of transit.213 The text of Article 33 of the Havana Charter was 
based on the Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organisations of the United Nations.  
At that time, however, a shift of the balance of power in the Congress of the United States of 
America began to loom. After that it was expected that Congress would not support the found-
ing of the ITO anymore. Since the consent of the Unites States of America was crucial for the 
establishment of the ITO, the governments participating the negotiations decided to bring the 
already agreed tariff cuts and the GATT provisionally into force before the final round of nego-
tiations to found the ITO were completed in order to save at least the outcome of the respec-
tive negotiations.214 As a consequence thereof, they adopted the Protocol of Provisional Appli-
cation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter referred to as „GATT 1947“) 
which was signed by 23 negotiating countries bringing provisionally into force the tariff cuts 
and the GATT 1947 on and after 1 January 1948.215  
Further negotiations for the founding of the ITO, back then, were put on hold even though the 
contracting parties had agreed on the final text of the ITO charter and thereafter never started 
again because it became apparent that the Congress of the United States of America would not 
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grant its necessary approval216 and the other negotiating states were, as a consequence there-
of, not willing to introduce a global trading system without the participation of the United 
States of America, at that time the largest economy in the world.217 
Due to its provisional character, GATT 1947 lacked the necessary framework for the work of an 
international institution: Neither did it call for any provisions regarding its institutions or pro-
cedures nor did it contain any regulation on GATT's authority or legal status.218 To cure these 
'birth defects' the member states decided to revise GATT 1947 during the so-called “Uruguay 
round”.219 The new World Trade Organisation was then finally founded in 1995 with the coming 
into force of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter 
referred to as the „WTO Agreement“). Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement consists of the current 
applicable GATT 1994 and various other agreements. GATT 1994 consists of the text of GATT 
1947 which has been amended in certain provisions.220  
The texts of GATT 1947 - and thus also GATT 1994 - were based on the Article 33 of the Ha-
vana Charter. However, there exist several differences in regard to these texts, mainly in re-
gard to (i) the definition of traffic in transit,221 and (ii) the respective interpretative notes: Arti-
cle V of GATT 1994 has an interpretative note which has not been part of the Havana Charter 
which in contrast contained three interpretative notes to its Article 33 which were not carried 
into GATT.  
2. Interpretation of Article V of GATT 1994 
Even though every day goods are trafficking through numerous countries all over the world on 
their way to their destination which are in some cases also subject to transit restrictions, only 
a handful of trade disputes have been brought before the GATT or the WTO. All of these dis-
putes, however, have been settled between the respective parties in mutual agreements in 
various stages of the dispute settlement procedure and have, therefore, not resulted in a panel 
report.222  
In 2009, finally, a trade dispute between Panama and Columbia regarding various Columbian 
customs measures to Panama exports of textiles, apparel and footwear, such as the use of 
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indicative prices in customs procedures and restrictions on ports of entry available for Pana-
man exporters of these goods, has been decided by a WTO Panel.223  
Recently, another case concerning Article V of GATT 1994 was pending at the WTO: India and 
Brazil had requested consultations with the European Union in regard to Indian produced ge-
neric medicines which were destined for Brazil, but have been seized on grounds of patent in-
fringement when transiting through the Netherlands.224 The central issue of this case is wheth-
er or not the freedom of transit also protects generic medicines which infringe patents or are 
suspected of such an infringement in the transit country although they are legal in the export-
ing and importing countries. Up to now, other countries have requested to join this dispute as 
a third party, such as Turkey,225 Canada,226 Ecuador,227 China,228 and Japan,229 which has been 
accepted by the European Union.230 However, in the following, no panel has been established 
as the parties of that dispute, again, reached a mutually agreed solution to the matter.231 
In front of this background, the panel decision, Columbia - Indicative Prices and Restrictions on 
Ports of Entry (hereinafter referred to as the “Panel Report”, and the panel as the „Panel“), is, 
up to now, the only guideline for the interpretation of Article V of GATT 1994. The Panel noted 
in this respect that since Article V has never been interpreted by a WTO panel “the Panel's task 
is therefore arduous since it will be necessary to interpret Article V of the GATT 1994 without 
any meaningful guidance.”232 Subsequently, the Panel therefore analysed Article V of GATT 
1994 “in accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation set for the in the VCLT233.”234  
2.1. Systematic of Article V of GATT 1994 
Article V of GATT 1994 consists of seven paragraphs and has – briefly summarised – the fol-
lowing scheme: 
 Article V:1 of GATT only provides for a definition of 'transit in traffic' and has further-
more no further regulatory content;235  
 Article V:2 1st sentence of GATT 1994 calls for the general freedom for goods in trans-
it,236  
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 Article V:2 2nd sentence and Article V:5 of GATT 1994 contain most favoured nation 
clauses for goods in traffic and for all charges and regulations imposed on traffic in 
transit;  
 Article V:3 of GATT 1994 further substantiates the obligation under Article V:2 1st sen-
tence of GATT 1994 determining that traffic in transit shall not be subject to unneces-
sary restrictions or delays and only to charges caused by the transit, whereas Article 
V:4 of GATT 1994 provides that such delays and restrictions must be reasonable;  
 Article V:6 of GATT 1994 generally extends this most favourite nation protection to 
member's goods which have been in transit once they have reached their final desti-
nation;237 and  
 Article V:7 clarifies that the provisions of Article V of GATT 1994 do not apply to the 
operation of aircraft in transit but to air transit of goods.  
However, it has to be pointed out that the Panel remains silent in respect to the interpretation 
of paragraphs V:3 and V:4 of GATT 1994 and their relationship to paragraph V:2 of GATT 1994. 
But, pursuant to the systematic of Article V of GATT 1994, Article V:2 1st sentence of GATT 
1994 contains the general provision for the freedom of transit whereas the paragraphs V:3 and 
V:4 contain a particular regulation for the circumstances stated therein. As a general principle 
of law, however, these particular provisions – as “leges speciales” – have to be applied prior to 
the general provision of paragraph V:2 1st sentence.238  
2.2. Interpretation of Article V:2 of GATT 1994 
As already mentioned above, Article V:2 of GATT 1994 contains two different obligations: The 
first sentence provides for the general freedom of transit whereas the second one calls for the 
most favourite nation treatment for goods in traffic.  
The Panel applies the principles of the Vienna Convention to Article V:2 and considers this pro-
vision “in accordance with its ordinary meaning in its context and in light of its object and pur-
pose where necessary [...] including the travaux preparatoires to inform its interpretation.”239  
However, after having examined the preparatory material of (i) the Barcelona Convention, (ii) 
the Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organisations of the United Nations and the 
respective report by the Technical Subcommittee (iii) as well as the Havana Charter for an In-
ternational Trade Organization, the Panel comes to the conclusion that this material is not of 
any assistance for the interpretation of Article V:2.240 It thus continues to interpret Article V:2 
of GATT 1994 by applying the other means of the Vienna Convention.  
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It has to be noted that, according to the Vienna Convention, the preparatory material is only to 
be considered if the other means of interpretation do not produce any results, i.e. that the 
Panel examined the preparatory material prematurely. However, it does not make a difference 
in this case, since the preparatory material is not of further assistance whereas the other 
means of interpretation are:  
2.2.1. Obligation under Article V:2 1st sentence of GATT 1994 
According to the Panel, Article V:2 1st sentence of GATT 1994 contains three elements241:  
a) Freedom of transit 
The Panel follows Panama's argumentation that 'freedom' means 'the unrestricted use of 
something' and that the first part of the 1st sentence thus calls for unrestricted transit traf-
fic through the territory of each contracting party.242  
b)  On the most convenient routes  
However, this obligation is then limited by the intermediate clause of the 1st sentence ac-
cording to which this freedom of transit only has to be granted on the most convenient 
routes.243 
It has to be noted that the Panel interprets the term 'the most convenient routes' in a dy-
namic sense, i.e. they not only have to be the most convenient routes at their opening, 
but also in the time thereafter. Should new routes be available in the future, which are 
more convenient than the already existing ones, the respective member has to adjust its 
transit routes to meet the needs of international transit.244  
c)  For traffic in transit  
The remainder of the 1st sentence then determines that there shall be freedom of transit 
for 'traffic in transit' The term 'traffic in transit' is defined in the preceding Article V:1 of 
GATT 1994 which reads as follows:  
“Goods (including baggage), and also vessels and other means of transport, shall be 
deemed to be in transit across the territory of a contracting party when the passage 
across such territory, with or without transhipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or 
change in the mode of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and 
terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting party across whose territory the traf-
fic passes. Traffic of this nature is termed in this article “traffic in transit”. 
Pursuant to the Panel, this provision seems sufficiently clear on its face, if read as a whole 
and objectively: „When applied to Article V:2, 'freedom of transit' must thus be extended 
to all traffic in transit when the goods' passage across the territory of a Member is only a 
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portion of a complete journey beginning and termination beyond the border of the Member 
beyond whose territory the traffic passes. Freedom of transit must additionally be guaran-
teed with or without trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode 
of transport.“245 
d)  Conclusion 
Considering the ordinary meaning of the term 'freedom' and the wording of Article V:2 1st 
sentence of GATT 1994 in the light of Article V:1 of GATT 1994, the Panel then finally con-
cludes, „that the provision of 'freedom of transit' pursuant to Article V:2, first sentence re-
quires extending unrestricted access via the most convenient routes for the passage of 
goods in international transit whether or not the goods have been trans-shipped, ware-
housed, break-bulked, or have changed modes of transport. Accordingly, goods in interna-
tional transit from any Member must be allowed entry whenever destined for the territory 
of a third country.”246 
2.2.2. Most favourite nation obligation under Article V:2 2nd sentence of GATT 1994  
In regard to Article V:2 2nd sentence of GATT 1994 the Panel first establishes that its text does 
not explicitly refer to transit in traffic but that is sufficiently clear from the text that the most 
favourite nation obligation of this provision is closely related to the obligation to extend free-
dom of transit in the first sentence.247  
According to the Panel, the obligation of Article V:2 2nd sentence of GATT 1994 therefore com-
plements the protection under the 1st sentence of Article V:2 of GATT 1994 prohibiting “mem-
bers from making distinctions in the treatment of goods, based on their origin or trajectory 
prior to arriving in their territory, based on their ownership, or based on the transport or the 
vessel of the goods.”248 It finally concludes that “goods from all Members must be ensured an 
identical level of access end equal conditions when proceeding in international traffic.”249 In 
any case, Article V:2 2nd sentence is not applicable in the present case because the Kenyan 
restrictions do not discriminate between the Ugandan and other non-Kenyan carriers.  
2.2.3. Most favourite nation obligation Article V: 6 of GATT 1994 
Pursuant to the Panel, Article V:6 of GATT 1994 generally extends the most favourite nation 
protection to a member's goods which have been in transit, i.e. once they have arrived in a 
member's territory of their final destination.250 However, Article V:6 of GATT 1994 is not appli-
cable in the present case since the Kenyan restrictions only hinder the transport of Ugandan 
goods on their way to their final destination, i.e. which are still in transit.  
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2.3. Consistency with Article V:3 of GATT 1994 
The Kenyan restrictions to the Ugandan transit of goods through Kenya could be inconsistent 
with Article V:3 of GATT 1994.  
2.3.1. Interpretation of Article V:3 of GATT 1994 
The Panel did not have to apply Article V:3 and V:4 of GATT 1994 since the Columbian 
measures in question only referred to the port of entry restrictions. The Panel Report is there-
fore silent about the interpretation of paragraph V:3 and V:4 and only examines whether the 
Columbian measures are consistent with the general obligation under V:2 1st sentence, 2nd 
sentence and V:6. However, since the former provisions contain the more particular regulation 
they have to be examined prior to Article V:2 of GATT 1994. In the following, the means of the 
Vienna Convention will be applied. 
2.3.2. Obligations under Article V:3 of GATT 1994 
Pursuant to its wording, the opening text of this provision simply reaffirms that freedom of 
transit only has to be granted on certain routes and a member thus can require that transit 
traffic enters its territory at the proper customs house.  
The intermediate clause then calls – as a general rule – for (i) the unrestricted transit of the 
goods, i.e. the right of a member to transport goods through another member state without 
being subject to any unnecessary delays or impediments, and (ii) the exemption of traffic in 
goods from customs duties. These obligations, however, do not apply in the case of failure to 
comply with the applicable customs law and regulations of the transit member, i.e. only regu-
lar transit is subject to the conditions of Article V:3 of GATT 1994.  
In regard to the latter obligation – (ii) – the remainder of Article V:3 of GATT 1994 then ex-
empts from the obligation to guarantee unrestricted transit of goods two charges a Member 
may legitimately impose on traffic in transit which are (i) charges for transportation and (ii) for 
administrative expenses resulting from transit or services rendered in this respect.  
It has to be noted that Article V:3 of GATT 1994 has to be read in connection with paragraph 
V:4 which provides as follows: “All charges and regulations imposed by contracting parties on 
traffic in transit to or from the territories of other contracting parties shall be reasonable, hav-
ing regard to the conditions of the traffic.” Article V:4 of GATT 1994 thus determines that the 
charges and regulations, which can, as an exemption, be imposed on traffic in transit, (i) must 
have been caused by this traffic and (ii) in addition to that must be reasonable. The term 
'charges' in this context is to be interpreted as to include charges for transportation by gov-
ernment owned railways or other government owned modes of transportation.251 
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2.3.3. Interpretation of the term 'unnecessary' 
The Panel Bodies of the WTO have not yet commented on the meaning of the term 'unneces-
sary' in Article V of GATT 1994, but they have interpreted various other provisions in the WTO 
law referring as well to the term 'necessary', such as Articles XX and XXI of GATT 1994,252 Ar-
ticles VI:4 and XIV of GATS, Article 2 of the TBT Agreement,253 Articles 2.2 and 5.6 of the SPS 
Agreement.254  
In these cases the Panel Bodies applied a so-called 'necessity test' balancing two important 
goals within the WTO law: On the one hand, they guarantee a member's right to regulate and 
pursue his or her own policy objectives and, on the other hand, they prevent undue trade re-
strictions by requiring that trade restrictive measures are only allowed in case they are 'neces-
sary' to achieve this goal.  
These necessity tests applied by the Panel Bodies, therefore, usually contain three elements: (i) 
the measure at issue, (ii) the objective, which the measure is aimed to achieve, and (iii) the 
link between this measure and this objective, the necessity of the measure to achieve the ob-
jective.255  
However, it has to be pointed out, that the Panel Bodies consistently stressed that, even 
though some provisions have the same or a similar text, the interpretation of 'necessary' of a 
panel body of one provision cannot be automatically applied to another provision, but that 
each Article in the WTO law has to be interpreted individually in line with the customary rules 
of interpretation in international law as stated in the Vienna Convention, considering its ordi-
nary meaning in its context and in the light of its object and purpose.256 One reason for this is 
the different nature of these provisions, some of which create an obligation for the members, 
whereas others formulate an exception to such an obligation. Since exceptional rules are, as 
stated above, to be interpreted narrowly the range of objectives a measure may seek is gener-
ally more limited and fundamental in nature and the degree of necessity to be achieved in or-
der to be necessary is higher, whereas they are more open respectively lower in obliging provi-
sions.257 Furthermore, also the burden of proof usually differs in obliging and exceptional pro-
visions: In the former case, it is on the complainant to prove that all requirements of the re-
spective provision are met, whereas in the latter case the respondent has to prove that the 
requirements of the exceptional provision are met.  
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Article V:3 of GATT 1994 further substantiates the basic obligation of Article V:2 1st sentence 
of GATT 1994 regulating which conditions a member may impose on transit in traffic: It enti-
tles a member to require from another member that its transit traffic in not subject to any un-
necessary delays or restrictions and be exempt from customs charges. Therefore, it both cre-
ates a new obligation for the members and also exempts the necessary transit delays and re-
strictions from the basic obligation in paragraph V:2. As far as it constitutes an exception, i.e. 
in regard to the necessary delays and restrictions, it thus has to be interpreted narrowly.  
Also the context of Article V:3 of GATT 1994 calls for a narrow interpretation: This Article is 
headed 'freedom of transit' and the previous paragraph calls for freedom of transit.  
Furthermore, the Preamble of GATT 1994 implies a narrow interpretation: According to the 
Preamble of GATT 1994 the signatories recognized “that their relations in the field of trade and 
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring 
full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, 
developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and ex-
change of goods,” and were thus „desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of 
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in interna-
tional commerce.“ A substantial reduction of other barriers to trade can, however, only be 
achieved, if the exceptions to the agreed obligations are interpreted narrowly to prevent their 
misuse.  
The objective and purpose of Article V:3 of GATT 1994 as well requires a narrow interpretation 
of that provision. Article V:3 of GATT 1994 shall solve the conflict of interests between, on the 
one hand, the legitimate right of a member to secure that the traffic in transit through its 
country corresponds with its laws and regulations and, on the other hand, the right of the oth-
er members to transport goods through that country without being subject to any unnecessary 
restrictions and delays. This conflict has to be resolved by limiting the permissible delays and 
restrictions to the measures which are essential for the proper handling of the transit goods.  
If interpreted narrowly, however, a delay or restriction is therefore only not 'unnecessary', i.e. 
necessary, if it (i) seeks to achieve a substantial objective and (ii) is on the continuum of ne-
cessity more on the side of 'being indispensable'.  
3. Consistency of the Kenyan restrictions with Article V:3 of GATT 1994 
The Kenyan restrictions could be inconsistent with Article V:3 of GATT 1994.  
3.1. Article V:3 1st alternative of GATT 1994 
Article V:3 1st alternative of GATT 1994 determines that the traffic in transit shall not be sub-
ject to any unnecessary delays.  
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3.1.1. The proper customs house 
The goods destined for Uganda from third countries or vice versa generally are transported on 
the Northern Corridor, which is the most convenient route in that region, and thus enter Kenya 
on the proper customs houses.  
3.1.2. Traffic in transit subject to any unnecessary delays? 
Several of the Kenyan restrictions could result in unnecessary delays for the Ugandan traders: 
3.1.2.1. Kenyan police only allows trucks registered in Kenya to transport goods 
destined to Tanzania on their way through Kenya  
This frequent practice by the Kenyan police therefore has to result in delays which are unnec-
essary in order to be inconsistent with Article V:3 1st Alternative of GATT 1994.  
a)  Delays as a consequence of repacking 
The ban of the Kenyan police for trucks not registered in Kenya to transport goods 
coming from Uganda destined to Tanzania and vice versa results in significant delays 
in case Ugandan carriers have to reload their goods on Kenyan registered trucks.  
b)  Unnecessary 
This practice of the Kenyan police is not necessary and thus inconsistent with Article 
V:3 of GATT 1994. Kenya has up to now not provided any reasons for this practice. 
One objective for this practice mentioned unofficially in this respect is the prevention 
of business loss for Kenyan carriers in case carriers from other Partner States under-
take transit transport.258 However, this objective is not sufficient to make this practice 
a necessary and thus permissible measure: As stated above, only substantive objec-
tives, such as the protection of the life or health of the member's citizens or of the na-
tional security, can justify such a measure. Yet, the mere pecuniary interests of its 
carriers by giving them a competitive advantage over their competitors from neigh-
bouring countries, is, in general, not such a substantive objective.  
This applies even more so as this practice is also inconsistent with the Kenyan obliga-
tions under the EAC Agreements ratified by Kenya to guarantee freedom of transit, the 
same opportunities for all carriers of all Partner States or to eliminate non-tariff barri-
ers.259  Kenya is obliged under Article 8(2) of the Treaty to “secure the enactment and 
the effective implementation of such legislation as is necessary to give effect to this 
Treaty.” Since this measure is also inconsistent with the Kenyan obligations under the 
EAC Agreements it can, as stated above, therefore, not be necessary. Only a measure 
consistent with these Agreements can be necessary. Otherwise, Kenya‟s behaviour 
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would be conflicting and contradictory to its own obligations under the EAC Agree-
ments. 
Last but not least, also a weighing and balancing of the interests of the parties in-
volved leads to the conclusion that this measure cannot be not necessary: The objec-
tive to protect the mere pecuniary interests of the Kenyan carriers, which stands in 
contradiction to the aims and objectives of the EAC Agreements and the WTO law, has 
to stand back behind the objective of fair trade and the interests of the Ugandan carri-
ers to transport their goods as unrestrictedly as possible in order to be able to com-
pete with the Kenyan carriers. With that practice in place fair competition is not possi-
ble, since the Ugandan carriers have additional costs they have to pass on to their 
customers. This impact of that Kenyan procedure, therefore, is out of proportion to its 
objective as a consequence of which it cannot be necessary as provided in Article V:3 
1st Alternative of GATT 1994.  
3.1.2.2. The auctioning of the Ugandan goods after lapse of the warehousing period 
The auctioning of goods makes it impossible for Ugandan transporters to deliver their goods in 
time and thus also results in delays. This practice is as well 'not necessary' and thus incon-
sistent with Article V:3 1st Alternative of GATT 1994.  
Kenya up to now has not submitted a reason for this measure. However, it has indicated that 
this measure is needed to decongest the port of Mombasa.260 This objective, however, is not a 
substantive objective within the meaning of Article V:3 of GATT 1994: The aim to decongest of 
the port is not comparable to the objective to protect the Kenyan citizens or their health. And, 
in addition to that, a state has to provide itself with the means to implement its policies, so the 
lack of doing so, cannot be used to justify its inconsistent behaviour. By this practice, however, 
Kenya transfers the burden of the ineffective port of Mombasa on to the Ugandan traders 
whose goods are auctioned even though the lapse of the grace period is in most cases not 
their own fault but rather caused by ineffective port and rail services in Kenya.  
Furthermore, Kenya could apply other measures, that are less restrictive to trade, to solve this 
problem, in particular it could provide for more warehouse space at the harbour and for more 
effective port, customs and rail services. Alternatively, it could also extend the grace period to 
a more reasonable time period as it is provided for under Article 42(1) of the Customs Man-
agement Act, which calls for the lapse of another 30 days after notice has been given before 
the goods may be auctioned, and therefore also is violated by this practice.  
But even if one would assume that no such alternatives exist, this practice would also be un-
necessary after weighing and balancing the importance of the common interests or values pro-
tected by that regulation and the accompanying impact of the measure on the transit goods. 
This practice aims to decongest the port. On the other hand, the auctioning of goods is the 
                                           
260  
Ihiga Simon 'Monitoring Mechanism for Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers in EAC' (2009), page 59.  
 
 
 
 
62 
 
most possible impairment of the rights of the importer: He loses the ownership of his goods 
and has to re-order them. It has to be pointed out in this context that in most cases the longer 
remaining of the goods is not the failure of the importer but rather a result of slow clearance at 
the port or lack of railway wagons. The importer's rights are thus affected in their essential 
component whereas the interests of the Kenyan customs are only affected peripherally. There-
fore, the importer‟s rights have to be weighed more than the ones of the customs. Also for this 
reason and as a consequence this practice is unnecessary.  
3.1.2.3. The other Kenyan restrictions 
The other Kenyan restrictions do not result in significant delays for the transit of the Ugandan 
goods through Kenya and thus do not conflict with Article V:3 1st alternative of GATT 1994. 
3.2. Article V:3 2nd alternative of GATT 1994 
But the Kenyan measures could also constitute unnecessary restrictions according to Article 
V:3 2nd alternative of GATT 1994. Pursuant to its ordinary meaning a restriction is something 
that limits something else, in the present case the Ugandan trade. 261  
3.2.1. Auctioning of Ugandan goods after lapse of warehousing period 
As stated above,262 the auctioning of Ugandan goods after lapse of the warehousing period by 
Kenyan customs is conceivably the most serious impairment, and thus constitutes a restriction 
to Ugandan transit since the Ugandan traders lose their goods and have to re-order them. This 
practice is also unnecessary since there are other less trade restricting alternatives for Kenya 
at hand and the Ugandan affected interest outweighs the Kenyan ones.263  
3.2.2. Kenyan police only allows trucks registered in Kenya to transport goods 
through Kenya on their way to Tanzania 
Also this Kenyan practice restricts the transit of Ugandan goods through Kenya to Tanzania 
since the Ugandan transporters loose time and money for the re-packing of the goods. In addi-
tion to that, it is as well unnecessary.264 
3.2.3. No back haulage allowed by Kenya for Ugandan transit trucks 
The ban on Ugandan transporters to transport goods on their way back if only a transit licence 
has been issued by the Kenyan authorities, too, restricts the Ugandan transit through Kenya 
making the transport of transit goods through Kenya more expensive. 
This practice is also unnecessary. Kenya also has, up to now, not submitted any reason for this 
practice, but a protectionist background seems to be likely, i.e. that Kenya wants to give their 
carriers another advantage over their competitors from other Partner States by keeping them 
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away from their domestic market. This objective, however, is not a substantive one as re-
quested to pass the necessity test of this provision.265 Furthermore, this practice is also incon-
sistent with EAC law and therefore unnecessary within the meaning of Article V:3 of GATT 
1994.266 Finally, also the interests of the Ugandan traders of an unrestricted and fair trade and 
transportation through Kenya outweigh the Kenyan interests to protect the mere pecuniary 
interests of its transporters.  
3.2.4. Local council fees applied to Ugandan transit cargo 
This practice by the Namanga District Council also restricts the Ugandan transit through Kenya 
since it results in additional costs for Ugandan transporters and traders.  
These council fees are not a charge for transportation in the meaning of the remainder of Arti-
cle V:3 of GATT 1994 and therefore not permissible as an exemption: Pursuant to its ordinary 
meaning a charge for transportation is the return for the carriage of goods from one place to 
another, i.e. a member can only claim charges for transportation if it provides transportation 
services for the goods transiting though its country. This reading of paragraph V:3 of GATT 
1994 also is backed up by the object and purpose of that provision, namely to balance the in-
terest of the member to unrestrictedly transport goods through other member states and the 
interests of the transit member to secure the application of its laws and regulations and to get 
reimbursed for its respective costs, subject that these are reasonable. However, these council 
fees are not raised in connection with the provision of such transportation services, and this 
exception is, thus, not applicable.  
These council fees can also not be qualified as administrative expenses entailed by transit. This 
alternative covers from its ordinary wording all administrative costs to build and maintain the 
transit infrastructure and for other administrative services rendered in connection with the 
transit of goods. However, since the underlying Kenyan act explicitly does not cover traffic in 
transit, these fees cannot be administrative fees caused by transit and this exception can 
therefore not be applied.  
These fees are also unnecessary, because they are inconsistent with the Kenyan law, since 
according to the underlying act these fees shall not apply to transit goods. Also the weighing 
and balancing of the affected interests results in this measure being unnecessary: The Ugan-
dan interest to transport goods through Kenya without being subject to unnecessary re-
strictions outweighs the Kenyan interest to enforce a measure inconsistent with its own laws.  
3.2.5. Application of abolished taxes at the Kenyan border to Ugandan transit goods  
Also the frequent practice to apply already abolished taxes at the Kenyan border to Ugandan 
transit goods restricts the Ugandan transit through Kenya due to the additional costs connect-
ed therewith.  
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This practice is unnecessary as well since under Kenyan law the Kenyan customs are not al-
lowed to apply those abolished taxes anymore. Also the weighing and balancing of the affected 
interests results in this measure being unnecessary: The Ugandan interest to transport goods 
through Kenya without being subject to unnecessary restrictions outweighs the Kenyan inter-
est to enforce a measure inconsistent with its own laws.  
3.3. Conclusion 
The Kenyan restrictions therefore are inconsistent with Article V:3 of GATT 1994.  
4. Consistency of the Kenyan restrictions with Article V:2 1st sentence of GATT 1994 
Since the Kenyan measures are inconsistent with the particular provision of Article V:3 of GATT 
1994 they are automatically also inconsistent with the general and therefore broader obligation 
to guarantee freedom of transit under Article V:2 1st sentence of GATT 1994, i.e. its duty to 
extend unrestricted access via the most convenient routes to goods in transit.  
5. Possible Kenyan defences 
The Kenyan breach of its obligations under Article V of GATT 1994, however, could be justified 
if one of the exceptional provisions of GATT 1994 would be applicable. 
5.1. Defence under Article XIX of GATT 
The Kenyan restrictions cannot be justified under Article XIX of GATT 1994 which allows - un-
der certain conditions - emergency actions on imports of particular products, since the Ugan-
dan goods transiting through Kenya do not constitute such imports and this provision is there-
fore not applicable. 
5.2. Defence under Article XXI of GATT 1994  
Kenya can also not invoke Article XXI of GATT 1994 as a defence for its restrictions. According 
to this provision restrictions pertaining to national security are permitted. There is no obvious 
reason how the Kenyan restrictions can be related to the protection of essential Kenyan securi-
ty interests.  
5.3. Defence under Article XX(d) of GATT 1994  
But the Kenyan restrictions could be permitted under Article XX(d) of GATT 1994. Article XX of 
GATT 1994, as a general exception, permits certain measures for particular purposes, such as 
the protection of public morals; the protection of human, animal, plant life or health. In the 
present case, however, only lit. d) could be applicable.  
It has to be pointed out that pursuant to the established GATT case law, Article XX of GATT 
1994 does not provide for new obligations itself, but instead calls for a list of general excep-
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tions under which measures of a member, which are inconsistent with other obligations under 
the GATT 1994, are justified as an exception.267 
The Appellate Body has consistently applied when examining, whether a measure is justified 
under Article XX of GATT 1994 or not, a two-tiered test:  
„In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at 
issue must not only come under one or another of the particular exceptions - paragraphs (a) 
to (j) - listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening 
clauses of Article XX.“268 
In regard to paragraph XX(d) of GATT 1994 the Appellate Body stressed that two elements 
must be satisfied:  
"For a measure, otherwise inconsistent with GATT 1994, to be justified provisionally under 
paragraph (d) of Article XX, two elements must be shown. First, the measure must be one 
designed to 'secure compliance' with laws or regulations that are not themselves incon-
sistent with some provision of the GATT 1994. Second, the measure must be 'necessary' to 
secure such compliance. A Member who invokes Article XX(d) as a justification has the bur-
den of demonstrating that these two requirements are met.“269 
With respect to the first element it has to be noted that pursuant to the established case law of 
the Appellate Body, the responding member's law will be treated as WTO consistent until prov-
en otherwise.270  
As for the second element, the Appellate Body has, over the years, established the following 
tests in order to examine whether or not a measure is necessary:  
 The 'reasonably available alternatives' test 
The Appellate Body has decided that a measure cannot be considered as 'necessary' 
within the meaning of Article XX of GATT 1994 “if an alternative measure which [a 
Member] could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with 
other GATT provisions is available to it.”271  
In this connection it has to be noted that the Appellate Body takes into account several 
factors to ascertain whether or not a suggested measure is reasonably available, such 
as (i) the importance of the value pursued by the measure at issue, (ii) the extent to 
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which the alternative measure contributes to the realisation of the end pursued, or (iii) 
the difficulties of implementation of this alternative measure.272  
In regard to the first factor the Appellate Body has stressed that, in any case, the more 
vital or important the common interests or values pursued, the easier it will be to ac-
cept the measure as necessary to achieve these aims.273 As for the third alternative, 
the Panel Body held that the alternative measure can only be ruled out if it is shown to 
be impossible to be implemented, whereas an alternative measure does not cease to 
be reasonable only because of administrative difficulties.274  
It has to be pointed out, that according to the established case law of the Appellate 
Body, the burden of proof that no such 'reasonably available alternative' exists is on 
the member invoking Article XX of GATT 1994, 275 i.e. in our case on Kenya. 
 The 'weighing and balancing' test 
The Appellate Body introduced in its report 'Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of 
Fresh, Chilled and Beef' another test, the so-called 'weighing and balancing' test. Look-
ing first at the ordinary meaning of the term 'necessary', it concluded that there exists 
a certain range of necessity between being 'indispensable' on the one side and 'needed' 
or 'making a contribution to' on the other side of that range.276 The Appellate Body 
stressed in the following, that “a necessary measure is [in the context of Article XX of 
GATT 1994], in this continuum, located significantly closer to the pole of 'indispensable' 
than to the opposite pole of simply 'making contribution to.'”277  
According to the Appellate Body “in every case a process of weighing and balancing of 
a series of factors” is to be conducted” in order to determine the extent of necessity 
within the contemplation of Article XX of GATT 1994.278 The factors to be considered in 
this weighing and balancing may “include the contribution made by the compliance 
measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the 
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common interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying 
impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.”279  
It has to be noted that the case law of the Panel Bodies regarding Article XX(b) of 
GATT 1994 can also be applied in the context of Article XX(d) of GATT since according 
to the established case law of the Panel Bodies the term 'necessary' in Article XX of 
GATT 1994 is to be interpreted in a uniform way, even though it refers to factually dif-
ferent situations280:  
“The Panel could see no reason why under Article XX the meaning of the term 'neces-
sary' under paragraph (d) should not be the same as in paragraph (b). In both para-
graphs the same term was used and the same objective intended: to allow contracting 
parties to impose trade restrictive measures inconsistent with the General Agreement 
to pursue overriding policy goals to the extent that such inconsistencies were unavoid-
able.”281  
In conclusion, a measure is, therefore, to be considered as 'necessary' if (i) there is an 
alternative measure available to that member, the member could be reasonably ex-
pected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions, or (ii) the 
process of weighing and balancing of the aforementioned criteria has to be conducted 
in order to determine whether a sufficient degree of necessity is given in the case in 
question.  
Therefore, the Kenyan restrictions must be cumulatively (i) designed to secure compliance with 
laws or regulations that are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the GATT 1994 
and (ii) necessary to secure such compliance.  
5.4. Designed to secure compliance with GATT 1994 consistent laws or regulations 
Pursuant to the burden of proof, Kenya has to prove that its restrictions are designed to secure 
compliance with laws and regulations that are themselves consistent with GATT 1994.282 Up to 
now, Kenya has not identified any laws or regulations on which the restrictions at issue are 
based. Nevertheless, these measures are, in any case, not designed to secure compliance with 
laws and regulations which are themselves consistent with GATT 1994 and thus not justified 
under Article XX(d) of GATT 1994.  
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5.4.1. Local council fees and application of abolished taxes at the border  
As for the application of the local council fees and the application of abolished taxes at the 
border, these measures are not based on any laws or regulations applicable in Kenya.283 Hence, 
these Kenyan measures are not designed to secure compliance with a law or regulation.  
5.4.2. Auctioning of Ugandan goods after lapse of warehousing period 
With respect to the auctioning of Ugandan goods after lapse of the re-warehousing period, 
Kenya could possibly claim that this practice is supposed to ensure compliance with its cus-
toms warehousing procedures and practices. However, the respective provision in the Kenyan 
customs law entitling the Kenyan customs to auction the Ugandan goods after lapse of that 
period itself is inconsistent with Article V:3 of GATT 1994, because (i) it unnecessarily restricts 
Ugandan traffic in transit, (ii) there are less trade restrictive alternatives reasonably available 
to Kenya such as the improvement and extension of the existing port and rail infrastructure 
and (iii) it also violates Article 42(1) of the Customs Management Act.284  
5.4.3. Remaining Kenyan restrictions 
In regard to the other restrictions at issue, Kenya cannot claim that these are implemented to 
ensure compliance with its customs law since they do not relate in any form to the implemen-
tation of general customs procedures and practices, such as the clearance of goods or other 
formalities regarding the importation or exportation of goods. However, should there be a 
Kenyan laws or regulations, on which these measures are based, they would themselves in any 
case be inconsistent with Article V:3 of GATT because these laws and regulations themselves 
would unnecessarily restrict the Ugandan traffic.  
5.4.4. Conclusion 
Thus, there are no WTO consistent Kenyan laws and regulations, whose compliance shall be 
secured by the Kenyan restrictions. Consequently, the first element of Article XX(d) of GATT is 
not given with respect to the Kenyan restrictions in the present case.  
5.5. Necessary to secure such compliance 
However, even if one would assume that there are WTO law consistent laws and regulations 
the compliance of which shall be secured by the Kenyan restrictions, these measures would, in 
any case, not be necessary to secure such compliance. 
Considering the aforementioned principles of the Panel Bodies with respect to the necessity 
tests, the Panel concluded: “Thus, in evaluating whether the ports of entry measure is neces-
sary within the meaning of Article XX(d), the Panel will consider: (i) the relative importance of 
the common interests or values that the law or regulation to be enforced is intended to protect; 
(ii) the extent to which the measures contribute to the realization of the end pursued; and, (iii) 
                                           
283
  See Chapter 2 lit. 2.3 above. 
284  
See Chapter 4 lit. 3.1.2.1 b) above.  
 
 
 
 
69 
 
the restrictive impact of the measure on imported goods.”285 Subsequently, the Panel considers 
if no alternative measure is available, that could reasonably be employed and which is not in-
consistent with other GATT provisions.286  
5.5.1. Auctioning of Ugandan goods after lapse of warehousing period 
This Kenyan measure, too, is not necessary within the meaning of Article XX(d) of GATT 1994 
as (i) it violates Article 42(1) of the Customs Management Act, (ii) there exist less trade re-
strictive alternatives which are also reasonably available to Kenya and (iii) the Kenyan interest 
to decongest the port is to be weighed less than the restrictive impact of that measure on the 
Ugandan traffic in transit.287  
5.5.2. Kenyan police only allows trucks registered in Kenya to transport goods 
through Kenya on their way to Tanzania 
This frequent practice by the Kenyan police is also not necessary. According to the established 
case law of the Panel Bodies, the more vital or important the common interests or values be-
hind that measure are, the easier it would be to be accepted as 'necessary' a measure de-
signed as an enforcement instrument.288 The protection of the pecuniary interests of the Ken-
yan carriers has – under the given circumstances – no significant benefit for the overall Ken-
yan economy whose transport sector is already competitive. This speaks against a necessity 
for this measure. The measure, on the one hand, is appropriate to achieve the end pursued, i.e. 
to protect the Kenyan carriers. But, on the other hand, this practice has significant impact on 
the Ugandan carriers who are running out of business on the transit routes to Tanzania. There-
fore, it has a competition distorting effect as a consequence of which the interests of the 
Ugandan traders outweigh the Kenyan protectionist interests so the measure at hand cannot 
be necessary.  
5.5.3. No back haulage allowed by Kenya for Ugandan transit trucks 
This practice is also not necessary according to Article XX(d) of GATT 1994 since it only serves 
the pecuniary interests of the Kenyan carriers as well, which are outweighed by the significant 
trade restrictive impact on the Ugandan carriers.289  
5.5.4. Local council fees applied to Ugandan transit cargo and application of abol-
ished taxes at the Kenyan border to Ugandan transit goods 
Since there is no legal basis for these Kenyan practices, the weighing and balancing results in 
the outweighing of the restrictive impact to Ugandan trade.  
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6. Conclusion 
Article V of GATT 1994 is to be interpreted in accordance with the principles of treaty interpre-
tation set out in the VCLT.  
Applying these principles Article V:1 and Article V:2 1st sentence of GATT 1994 have to be read 
as a whole and objectively, so that Article V:2 of GATT 1994 calls for the unconditional free-
dom of transit on the most convenient routes for all traffic in transit.  
Article V:2 2nd sentence complements this protection under Article V:2 1st sentence of GATT 
1994 once the goods have arrived in the respective destination Member State prohibiting any 
discrimination based on the origin, of the means of transport or on the ownership of the goods.   
Article V:3 of GATT 1994 further substantiates the basic obligation of Article 5:2 1st sentence of 
GATT 1994 regulating the conditions a member may impose on traffic in transit and thus is the 
more concrete provision. As far as this provision allows – as an exception – necessary transit 
delays and restrictions it has to be interpreted narrowly, i.e. only the delays and restrictions 
which are absolutely necessary for the proper handling of the transit goods are necessary as 
provided for in Article V:3 of GATT 1994. 
The Kenyan restrictions also are inconsistent with Article V:3 of GATT 1994 and not justified 
under one of the exceptions as set out in Articles XIX to XXI of GATT 1994. 
Thus, Uganda could also challenge the Kenyan restrictions in front of a WTO panel.   
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Chapter 5 - Possible conflict of jurisdiction  
 
Has it been a problem in the past to challenge possible breaches of international trade agree-
ments because there were no competent international courts nowadays states often are in the 
comfortable position to be able to choose between dispute resolutions mechanisms of various 
international or regional institutions. This is in particular a result of the increase of regional 
trade agreements within the recent years290 which has also been described as the so-called 
'spaghetti bowl' of overlapping regional trade agreements.291  
However, this situation also led to new discussions in international trade, 292 such as the issues 
of “double breaches”293 or “forum shopping”294. A double breach is the case that a measure by 
a state violates its obligations under different international trade agreements295 whereas the 
term forum shopping describes the consequences of such a situation and the opportunities of 
the complainant state to choose the best forum for to enforce its rights.296 The biggest concern 
resulting from such a situation is the risk of inconsistent rulings and that the remedies allowed 
under one agreement could violate the other agreement and vice versa.297  
Since the Kenyan restrictions are inconsistent with both the EAC Agreements and GATT 1994 
they constitute a double breach of the Kenyan obligations under these agreements which 
would, in general, entitle Uganda to institute dispute resolution proceedings in both the EAC 
and the WTO since both institutions have the respective jurisdiction.  
But eventually Uganda could be banned to initiate such proceedings before one forum if one of 
the agreements contains a clause calling for the exclusive jurisdiction of the respective dispute 
resolution body. The Appellate Body had to deal with the question of jurisdiction and possible 
impediments in its report 'Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages'. It came 
to the conclusion that even though the WTO panels have a right to determine, whether they 
have jurisdiction,298 they are in principle bound to rule a case presented by a Member consid-
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ering that any benefits accruing to that Member are being impaired by measures taken by an-
other Member.299 The Appellate Body continued as follows:  
“We express no view as to whether there may be other circumstances in which legal im-
pediments could exist that would preclude a panel from ruling on the merits of the claims 
that are before it. […] Finally, we note that Mexico has expressly stated that the so-called 
"exclusion clause" of Article 2005.6 of the NAFTA had not been "exercised". We do not ex-
press any view on whether a legal impediment to the exercise of a panel's jurisdiction 
would exist in the event that features such as those mentioned above were present. In 
any event, we see no legal impediments applicable in this case.”300  
However, even though the Appellate Body did not take a stand to the question how it would 
rule in case of an exclusive jurisdiction clause, it referred in a footnote to the Panel Report 'Ar-
gentina - Definitive anti-dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil'301: 
“The panel in Argentina - Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties referred to Article 1 of the Protocol 
of Olivos, which provides that, once a party decides to bring a case under either the MER-
COSUR or WTO dispute settlement forum, that party may not bring a subsequent case re-
garding the same subject-matter in the other forum, and went on to state: 
The Protocol of Olivos […] does not change our assessment, since that Protocol has not yet 
entered into force, and in any event it does not apply in respect of disputes already decid-
ed in accordance with the MERCOSUR Protocol of Brasilia. Indeed, the fact that parties to 
MERCOSUR saw the need to introduce the Protocol of Olivos suggests to us that they rec-
ognised that (in the absence of such Protocol) a MERCOSUR dispute settlement proceeding 
could be followed by a WTO dispute settlement proceeding in respect of the same meas-
ure.” 
So the question, whether or not a WTO panel is entitled to decline its jurisdiction should there 
be some legal impediment at hand and if so under which requirements, has not yet been final-
ly decided. But in case there is no exclusive jurisdiction in either of the agreements at hand 
this question would not have to be answered.  
1. Wording of the respective clauses 
Both the Treaty and the DSU contain provisions with respect to a possible violation of the re-
spective agreement:  
 Article 27(1) of the Treaty reads as follows:  
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“Jurisdiction of the Court 
1.  The Court shall initially have jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of 
this Treaty:  
Provided that the Court‟s jurisdiction to interpret under this paragraph shall not in-
clude the application of any such interpretation to jurisdiction conferred by the 
Treaty on organs of Partner States.” 
 On the other hand, Article 23(1) of the DSU, which is titled “Strengthening of the Multi-
lateral System”, provides as follows:  
“1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or 
impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the at-
tainment of any objective of the covered agreements; they shall have recourse to, 
and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.” 
2. Types of jurisdiction clauses 
Common provisions in regard to jurisdiction in international trade agreements are (i) choice of 
forum clauses, according to which exclusive jurisdiction is granted to a certain or to the first 
chosen dispute settlement mechanism, (ii) exclusive jurisdiction clauses requiring that the re-
spective mechanism shall be exclusively competent for all disputes under the respective 
agreements, and (iii) preference clauses, regulating that one forum is preferably competent, 
but the parties may change to call on another dispute settlement mechanism.302  
3. Interpretation of Article 27(1) of the Treaty 
According to their wording, these provisions only refer to disputes between two Member States 
over the interpretation and application of the Treaty calling for jurisdiction of the respective 
dispute settlement mechanism. It has been argued that such a clause is to be considered as a 
compulsory exclusive jurisdiction clause which could result in a conflict of jurisdiction.303 How-
ever, such an interpretation, i.e. that all disputes between the Partner States – regardless of 
what other international agreement is in dispute – should be exclusively handled by the Court 
of Justice, would go beyond the clear wording of this provision and thus beyond the limits of 
interpretation.  
Against the interpretation of Article 27(1) of the Treaty as a compulsory jurisdiction clause 
speaks that also the EAC Agreements acknowledge that each Partner State has to fulfil their 
obligation under other international agreements. Article 130(1) of the Treaty reads as follows: 
“The Partner States shall honour their commitments in respect of other multinational and in-
ternational organisations of which they are members.” As the EAC Agreements have been con-
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cluded after the WTO agreements Article 130(1) of the Treaty can only be read that a compul-
sory jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system is to be respected.  
In addition to that, also the second half of Article 27(1) of the Treaty shows that not all dis-
putes between the Partner States shall be under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice since it 
excludes the interpretation to jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty to organs of Partner States.  
Article 27(1) of the Treaty thus only contains an exclusive jurisdiction clause with respect to 
the interpretation and application of the Treaty.  
4. Interpretation of Article 23(1) of the DSU 
According to its wording, also Article 23(1) of the DSU refers to any disputes under the cov-
ered agreements only and does not explicitly state that all matters in this regard shall also fall 
under this jurisdiction.  
It has been argued, that the title and the context of Article 23 of the DSU imply that this 
clause is to be interpreted broadly as a compulsory jurisdiction clause according to which all 
matters regarding the covered agreements shall be brought before the WTO panels.304 In par-
ticular Article 3(2) and (3) of the DSU shall stress the importance of the dispute settlement 
systems for the WTO for the effective functioning of the WTO and the balancing of the rights 
and obligations of its members:  
„2.  The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security 
and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it 
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agree-
ments, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the 
covered agreements. 
3.  The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any benefits ac-
cruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by 
measures taken by another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the 
WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of 
Members.“ 
According to this view, these aims, however, can only be achieved if not just all disputes but 
all 'matters' concerning the covered agreements are exclusively dealt before the WTO under 
the DSU.305  
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But, one has to consider that that the WTO law also acknowledges and promotes the existence 
and development of regional trade agreements. Article XXIV(5) of GATT 1994, for example, 
reads as follows:  
“Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories 
of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the 
adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a 
free-trade area; […].”  
Such agreements, however, usually provide for a dispute settlement mechanism as a conse-
quence of which one could argue that the permission to form a regional trade agreement tacit-
ly implies that its members are allowed to regulate the dispute settlement mechanism in de-
viation of Article 23 of the DSU.  
In any case, the Panel Bodies of the WTO have consistently stressed that they would not apply 
the law of other regional trade agreements and thus the aforementioned clause cannot be 
classified as a compulsory exclusive jurisdiction clause: If Article 27(1) of the DSU was inter-
preted in that way, the WTO panels would also be have to be able to apply relevant non-WTO 
law in certain cases should there be another related claim which is not provided for in the law 
of the WTO.  
5. Conclusion 
Thus, neither the Treaty nor the GATT 1994 provide for an exclusive jurisdiction clause, as a 
consequence of which Uganda could initiate proceedings before both the WTO dispute settle-
ment mechanism and the EAC Court of Justice.  
The choice which forum to choose depends on various factors, such as the differences in law, 
the timeliness of proceedings, the adoption of panel reports, the availability of remedies at the 
end of the dispute.306 Furthermore, also the precedent to be set by the respective case is to be 
considered: Even though another case by the complainant could be more easily solved, the 
precedent set by this case could also work against the complainant itself should the respond-
ent or another member state of the respective agreement bring a case against the complain-
ant.307  
In the present case, however, it is to be recommended that Uganda initiates the respective 
proceedings – should further negotiations be in vain – before the WTO dispute settlement bod-
ies, since the DSU provides for efficient and proven procedures to solve disputes and to adopt 
the respective reports whereas no such case has up to now been decided by the Court of Jus-
tice.  
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Furthermore, there is a lesser risk in front of the WTO panels that Kenya would take influence 
as it has been the case before the Court of Justice when it had ruled in a case against Kenya in 
regard to the election procedure of the Kenyan member for the EAC Parliament in the Kenyan 
Parliament where Kenya took strong influence after a court decision regarding the election 
practice in Kenya for the EAC Assembly which was undesirable to the Kenyan Government at 
that time. Kenya thus replaced several judges at the EAC Court and had for this purpose even 
amending the EAC treaties just to ensure that the Court of Appeal would decide in its favour.308   
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Chapter 6 - Implications of the WTO Draft Negotiation Text on Trade Facilitation  
As already stated above, trade facilitation got into the focus of the discussion of international 
trade within the last 20 years. This also forms a part of the on-going negotiations at the 9th 
Ministerial Conference, which is actually held in Bali. After all the years of negotiations the con-
clusion of a separate Trade Facilitation Agreement seems possible, but it still remains to be 
seen if the considerable resistance and reluctance of various countries against such a separate 
agreement will be overcome.  
1. Singapore Ministerial Conference, 1996  
Within the WTO, proposals for trade facilitation commitments were made at the WTO Ministeri-
al Conference in Singapore 1996 for the first time, where it became part of the so-called Sin-
gapore Issues. In the following years the competent Council of Trade in Goods examined dif-
ferent aspects of trade facilitation in co-operation with numerous international and regional 
organisations as well as with the international business community. The main barriers to trade 
identified in these examinations were inter alia lack of transparency, excessive documentation 
requirements, inadequate procedures as well as a lack of modernization of customs and other 
government agencies.309  
2. Seattle Ministerial Conference, 1999  
In preparation of and during the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999, several pro-
posals were made in vain to include the facilitation of trade in the next negotiation round. 
However, the discussions nevertheless made progress, as the participants could agree that the 
relevant Articles of GATT 1994 (i.e. Articles V, VIII and X of GATT 1994) were to be amended 
and on the focus of the future discussions on trade facilitation, in particular the import and 
export requirements and procedures, development issues and technical assistance.  
3. Doha Ministerial Conference, 2001 
In 2001, a new attempt to initiate separate negotiations in trade facilitation was made during 
the Ministerial Conference in Doha. But again the members could not reach a consensus in this 
respect, since some members only wanted to discuss the Singapore Issues all together and 
objected to an individual treatment of certain topics. In particular some developing countries, 
although agreeing in principle with the objectives of trade facilitation, were not willing to as-
sume new obligations due to their limited implementation capacities and the possible exposure 
to new dispute settlement procedures in case these new trade facilitation obligations were not 
implemented in time.310 On the other hand, however, these countries stressed the importance 
of technical assistance and capacity building in regard to trade facilitation.311 Therefore, it was 
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decided that the discussions of trade facilitation should continue in the Council of Trade in 
Goods with one priority on a technical assistance work programme with the aim to provide 
guidance and to build capacities for trade facilitation in order that future results could be im-
plemented quickly.  
The Doha Ministerial Declaration thus reads as follows: “Recognizing the case for further expe-
diting the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit, and the need 
for enhanced technical assistance and capacity building in this area […] and identify the trade 
facilitation needs and priorities of members, in particular developing and least-developed coun-
tries. We commit ourselves to ensuring adequate technical assistance and support for capacity 
building in this area.” 
4. Cancún Ministerial Conference, 2004 
Finally, trade facilitation, for the first time, became an independent topic in the negotiations 
within the WTO as part of the Doha Development Agenda, when the WTO members agreed on 
the wording of Annex D, Modalities for Negotiations on Trade Facilitation, of the Decision 
Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 (the so-called “July Package”).312 Annex D 
determines that these negotiations shall be aimed to clarify and improve relevant aspects of 
Articles V, VIII and X of GATT 1994 “with a view to further expediting the movement, release 
and clearance of goods, including goods in transit, and enhancing technical assistance and 
support for capacity-building in this area” and also that a Negotiation Group on Trade Facilita-
tion was to be installed. Subsequent to the Cancún Ministerial Conference, the Negotiation 
Group on Trade Facilitation was established and began its work.  
5. Proposals and discussions regarding the freedom of transiting 
Within the Negotiation Group on Trade Facilitation, up to 2009 more than 130 proposals have 
been submitted which may be categorized as follows:  
5.1. First generation proposals 
The first proposals submitted in 2005 dealt in general with the objectives and reasons for the 
respective amendments of the relevant Articles of GATT 1994.  
5.2. Second generation proposals 
The second generation proposals dating in the first half of 2006 summarised and refined the 
concepts of earlier discussions providing various draft languages. It has to be noted that in this 
time period wider coalitions between WTO members were formed between various developed 
countries, on the one hand, and some developing countries, on the other hand, each coalition 
working together on various proposals. One reason for this division was the conflicting inter-
ests. During these discussions, the developing countries, again, stressed the importance of 
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receiving the right amount of technical assistance, while the developed countries insisted on 
their demands being met appropriately.313  
5.3. Third generation proposals 
The proposals since the second half of 2006 can be referred to as the third generation pro-
posals. They have in common that they further refine and clarify the concepts presented so far 
as a result of the on-going discussions within the Negotiation Group on Trade Facilitation. 
6. Compilations by the WTO secretariat 
The WTO secretariat has summarised these proposals in its Compilations of Member's Textual 
Proposals.314 As regards content, the proposals focused, inter alia, on the following main is-
sues315:  
 strengthening of non-discrimination measures;  
 inclusion of a legitimate policy objectives list in Article V of GATT 1994 considering in 
particular security objectives;  
 inclusion of transparency requirements such as the (internet) publication of transit 
fees and charges as well as requirements for customs formalities and document re-
quirements; 
 further harmonisation of customs documentation requirements and procedures, in-
cluding the introduction of periodic reviews and the co-ordination of border agencies 
such as single window; 
 simplification and facilitation of transit traffic through special transit procedures and 
facilities avoiding unnecessary controls ensuring the effective implementation of trans-
it procedures; 
 international, regional and national customs guarantee systems. 
7. (Revised) Draft Consolidated Negotiation Text 
In December 2009, a significant progress was finally made, when the members agreed to cir-
culate the first Draft Consolidated Negotiation Text as a basis for future discussions. This draft 
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has been revised 16 times by now, for the last time 29 July 2013 resulting in the actual Re-
vised Draft Consolidated Negotiation Text which actually comprises 30 pages.316  
The text of this draft thus has grown significantly, comprehensively covering and clarifying and 
improving most of the issues up to now in regard to trade facilitation. The draft comprises two 
sections of which the first one is covering in 13 Articles the various aspects of trade facilitation, 
in particular calling for freedom of transit in Article 11. The second section sets out special and 
differential treatment for developing and least developed countries.  
According to the current draft, comprehensive obligations in the various aspects of internation-
al trade are set, such as making available the necessary information to traders (Articles 1 to 3), 
providing for the necessary appeal and review procedures (Article 4), disciplines on fees and 
charges in regard to the importation or exportation of goods (Article 6), regulations regarding 
the release and clearance of goods (Article 7), the prohibition of consular clearance require-
ment (Article 8), trade facilitation Article 9 and 10), customs cooperation (Article 12) and for 
the freedom of transit (Article 11).    
8. Freedom of transit - Article 11 of the Draft Consolidated Negotiation Text   
It has to be noted that the Revised Draft Consolidated Negotiation Text is supposed to be con-
cluded as a separate Agreement substantiating the respective provisions of GATT 1994. Up to 
now, this draft does not repeat the rights and obligations under GATT 1994 as it was the gen-
eral feeling that (i) there would be no purpose by repeating the language of that agreement 
and (ii) thus an effort was made to reduce duplication and eliminate unnecessary texts.317 In 
consequence, e.g. Article 11 (Freedom of transit) does not provide for a corresponding obliga-
tion of the members but presupposes this obligation under Article V of GATT 1994. Therefore, 
the regulations of this draft have to be read together with the respective provisions of GATT 
1994.  
Article 11.2 clarifies that Member States shall secure that the (former) state enterprises with, 
formally or in effect, special or exclusive privileges on or in regard with transit in traffic will 
comply with the provisions of this agreement. This obligation would force Kenya to ensure that 
the KPA is treating Ugandan traders as they are treating Kenyan traders and thus could help to 
eliminate the discrimination of Ugandan traders at the port.  
Article 11.3 calls for the proportionality and the proper purpose of charges in relation to charg-
es, regulations and formalities in regard to transit. According to Article 11.3(1) (a) charges, 
regulations and formalities shall not be more restrictive on traffic in transit than necessary to 
fulfil a legitimate objective and according to lit. (b) only be maintained in that way as it is nec-
essary for the respective circumstances and/or objectives and (c) shall not be applied in a 
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manner that would constitute a disguised restriction on transit traffic. This provision merely 
stipulates the actual legal position as stated above but assures legal clarity. So, even according 
to these new requirements, the Kenyan restrictions would still also be in violation of the re-
vised WTO Agreements.  
Article 11(3)(2) clarifies that charges on traffic in transit are only allowed if they are imposed  
for  the  administrative  procedures  entailed  or  transit  services provided in connection with 
the transit movement in question (lit. a) and that the charges shall not  exceed  the  approxi-
mate  administrative  expenses  entailed  or  costs  of  the  transit service rendered.  
According to Article 11(3)(3) each Member State  shall  periodically  review  its  charges  on  
traffic  in  transit  with  a  view  to  reducing them, where practicable. 
Article 11(4) clarifies that Member States are not to apply discriminatory measures to goods in 
transit, or to vessels or other means of transport of other Members, for reasons of any kind 
unless they are justified under the current WTO Agreements.  
Article 11(5) and 11(6) call Member States to treat traffic in transit – on the same routes un-
der the like conditions and for the like products – no less favourable than the one which is not 
in transit, i.e. which is either import, export or domestic traffic (Article 11(5)) and to treat 
products which will be in transit through the territory of any other Member treatment no less 
favourable than that which would be accorded to such products if they were being transported 
from their place of origin to their destination without going through the territory of such other 
Member (Article 11(6)).    
Pursuant to Article 11 (8) formalities, documentation requirements and customs controls, in 
connection with traffic in transit, shall not be more burdensome than necessary to identify the 
goods and ensure fulfilment of transit requirements. 
Article 11(13) to (15) set out special provisions for guarantees which have to be reasonable 
and shall not be applied in a manner that would constitute a disguised restriction on traffic in 
transit (Article 11(13)) and which shall be discharged without delay once the transit require-
ments are met (Article 11(14)).  
Pursuant to Article 11(16) the use  of  customs  convoys  or  escorts  for  traffic  in  transit  is 
only allowed in circumstances  presenting  high  risks whereas circumstances  subject  to  cus-
toms  convoys  or  escorts requirements have to be included in Members Customs regulations 
and are to be published. 
It is unclear up to now whether or not also air transit shall fall under the definition in Article 11. 
According to the current draft, this shall not be the case and a clarifying clause may need to be 
added.318  
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It has to be noted that the final wording of all these provisions is not yet agreed upon and that 
the provisions of the Revised Draft Negotiation Text contain different alternatives for each 
clause. Therefore, the outcome of the final text and thus the implications thereof can, at this 
point in time, not be further assessed.  
9. Is the conclusion of an agreement still possible? 
The question to be asked in this context is whether it is still possible to save the Doha round in 
the on-going negotiations in Bali as more or less no significant progress has been made over 
the last decade.  
The reason for negotiation deadlock and the various delays of negotiation deadlines is to be 
seen in the complexity and the sensitive issues on the negation table, some of which have 
been unresolved since the Uruguay Round and the wrong negotiation methodology was 
used:319  
This round had been completed prematurely before Bill Clinton‟s authority to conduct trade 
negotiations expired leaving various issues unresolved.320 The main outcome of the Uruguay 
round was a significant degree in trade liberalisation across both developed and developing 
countries. However, further topics, such as the development agenda (i.e. the later the Doha 
Development Agenda), the liberalisation of the agricultural market, services, anti-dumping 
measures and subsidies, regional trade agreements, TRIPS, the environment and the so-called 
Singapore Issues remained unsolved and thus to be dealt with in the next negotiation round.321 
As a consequence hereof, there has been no need for the developed countries in the Doha 
round to further push the negotiations as they already had achieved most of their goals 
whereas there was the feeling by the developing countries that they were to be compensated 
for their acceptance of the full obligations of the Uruguay round.  
This conflict of interests was even made harder to resolve by the negotiation concept of a “sin-
gle undertaking” newly introduced at the Uruguay round. According to this concept all partici-
pants have to agree to the outcome of the negotiations or, put in other words, nothing is 
agreed to until everything is agreed upon.322  
In order to speed up the negotiations Pascal Lamy made the attempt to separate the various 
negotiation topics into several negotiation blocks to be agreed upon independently, the so 
called 'three speed search'. According to this approach, the various topics of the Doha round 
agenda should be approached at different speeds: in fast, slow and medium lanes. This new 
methodology has been widely criticized as being inconsistent with paragraph 47 of the Doha 
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Declaration calling for the single undertaking concept.323 However, even this new concept did 
so far not result in the conclusion of partial agreements and the negotiations have been sus-
pended for a longer time period before the actual Bali conference.  
It remains to be seen if the negotiations can be at least partly concluded at the on-going 9th 
WTO Ministerial Conference where only a limited number of topics, such as the WTO Trade 
Facilitation Agreement, are on the table. One argument for a conclusion of such a separate 
WTO Trade Facilitation Agreements is that it is undeniable that all countries would benefit from 
it. According to the OECD it is expected that trade costs in developed countries would decrease 
by approximately 10% and in undeveloped countries even by up to 13.5% to 15% and the 
reduction of the global trade costs by 1% would result in an increase of the global worldwide 
income by approximately USD 40 billion, most of which would accrue in developing countries. 
324  
However, some countries, like for example India and Brazil, seem to be unwilling to conclude a 
separate agreement on trade facilitation without getting something in return out of the remain-
ing topics in the on-going Doha negotiation round whereas in particular developing countries 
press for credible commitments on technical assistance and support for capacity building.325      
10. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the 17th version of the Revised Draft Negotiation Text is to be read together 
with GATT 1994, in particular with its Articles V and X as the new agreement only clarifies the 
already existing regulations and provides for an additional forum to discuss the issues in re-
gard to trade facilitation and transit traffic.  
Article 11 of the Revised Draft Negotiation Text provides for various clarifications and im-
provements in regard to the freedom of transit making it easier for the respective Member 
States to enforce their claims assuring legal clarity.  
It remains to be seen, if the Member States will agree to such a separate agreement and, and 
if so, on which wording of the Revised Draft Negotiation Text, they will agree upon.    
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion and recommendations 
 
The Kenyan restrictions have a significant negative effect on Ugandan trade and thus as well 
on its overall economy. Even a smaller reduction in the time and the costs for the transit of the 
Ugandan goods through Kenya is – under the prevailing economic theory – supposed to signifi-
cantly reduce the indirect and direct transit costs for Ugandan traders on their way through 
Kenya and thus to result in a significant growth in the Ugandan GDP supporting the various 
efforts of the Ugandan government to further develop the country.  
However, the Ugandan influence in Kenya to overcome these obstacles for its traders is more 
or less limited to negotiations as Uganda is dependent on the Kenyan goodwill in this matter.  
As the Kenyan restrictions are inconsistent both with its obligations under the EAC Agreements 
and under GATT 1994 – which both provide for a free movement of transit goods through the 
respective Member States – both the EAC Court of Justice Uganda and the WTO panels are 
competent to decide about the Kenyan restrictions.  
Since none of these agreements provide for an exclusiveness of its respective court, Uganda is 
free to choose the forum. It should initiate proceedings before the WTO panels in case Kenya 
omits to eliminate these transit restrictions in further negotiations as these WTO court guaran-
tees neutrality, which seems not to be guaranteed in front of the EAC Court of Justice.  
It remains to be seen whether or not the Member States of the WTO will agree on the actual 
Revised Draft Negotiation Text on Trade Facilitation at the on-going Ministerial Meeting in Bali 
which comprises some clarifications and improvements for the guarantee of freedom of transit 
already guaranteed in Article V of GATT 1994.  
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